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ABSTRACT 
 
Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) is an exogenous shock to the information 
environment of U.S.-listed firms, those firms might adjust their capital structures to 
reflect the new information environment.  Using univariate and multivariate tests, 
including differences-in-differences, I examine SOX’s effect on the capital structure of 
U.S.-listed firms relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada, which are treated as control 
firms since they are not subject to SOX.  The results indicate that, after the passage of 
SOX, U.S.-listed firms raise their long-term debt ratios by two to three percentage points, 
relative to the control group.  U.S. firms listed in the U.S. drive this result, while 
Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. do not alter their long-term leverage ratios after 
SOX.  The higher debt ratios do not occur because of lower rates of growth in equity and 
short-term debt after SOX for U.S.-listed firms, relative to control firms.  In addition, 
firms that heavily (lightly) manage earnings prior to SOX use less (more) debt after SOX. 
Previous research argues that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) could require managers to 
reveal bad news about their firms.  Bad news may cause market participants, including credit 
rating agencies, to update their beliefs about those firms and conclude that their outlook is not as 
profitable as initially thought.  In this paper, I examine short- and long-term credit ratings after 
SOX.  The main finding is that, in the SOX era, aggressive earnings management is associated 
with lower short- and long-term credit rating levels.  This result is robust to size and suppliers’ 
outlook on the economy. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction (Capital Structure) 
The capital structure literature suggests that information asymmetry affects firms’ 
financing decisions.  When asymmetric information exists to the detriment of outside 
investors, external financing is costlier than internal financing.  Although this situation 
will discourage firms with high information asymmetry from raising external funds, firms 
with low information asymmetry might be motivated to raise funds externally.   
However, the effect of asymmetric information on the relative use of debt versus 
equity is still debated.  On one hand, the incentive-signaling theory of capital structure 
(Ross, 1977) predicts that debt ratios will rise only for the most valuable firms.  This 
theory states that managers can mitigate information asymmetry by signaling their firms’ 
value through increased leverage.  Ross (1977) argues that only the most valuable firms 
will take on debt because of the need to allocate a portion of a firm’s future cash flows to 
repay the debt.   
On the other hand, Myers (1977) argues against Ross (1977) by suggesting that 
debt ratios will fall because of the debt-overhang problem.  The debt-overhang problem 
states that the presence of debt increases a firm’s probability of bankruptcy.  As a firm 
increases its debt load, its cost of borrowing will increase.  A high cost of borrowing will 
prevent some firms from borrowing external funds for growth.  As a result, those firms 
will pass up growth projects, lowering firm value.  Thus, Myers (1977) implies that lower 
leverage ratios are associated with more valuable firms. 
The pecking-order model (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984) also predicts a relationship between capital structure and asymmetric information.  
The pecking-order model states that, because external investors face asymmetric 
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information regarding the intrinsic value of firms’ securities, managers finance projects 
with retained earnings, external debt, and external equity, in that order of preference.  
Managers are said to prefer internal funds because their value is known.  However, if 
external funds are used, the model states that managers prefer to issue debt instead of 
common equity because debt, which stipulates cash flows to lenders, suffers from less 
value-related information asymmetry than common equity, which does not obligate 
managers to pay dividends to investors.  Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009) show that 
information asymmetry indeed drives the pecking-order model.   
While the above capital structure theories focus on the information asymmetry 
that external investors face relative to insiders, Easley and O’Hara (2004) address 
information asymmetry between two groups of external investors from a microstructure 
perspective.  In their model, one set of external investors has a richer information set than 
a second group of external investors.  Easley and O’Hara (2004) show that less-informed 
external investors require a higher rate of return on equity than more-informed external 
investors.  The reason is that less-informed external investors are disadvantaged because 
more-informed external investors have a richer information set and will benefit from 
trading on that information.  The higher rate of return on equity that less-informed 
external investors demand increases the required return on equity for external investors 
overall, leading to a higher cost of capital for the firm.   
Easley and O’Hara (2004) suggest that lower information asymmetry decreases 
the cost of equity.  Lower equity costs may encourage firms to finance projects with 
equity, leading to lower debt ratios.  Consistent with Easley and O’Hara (2004), Agarwal 
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and O’Hara (2008) find lower (higher) leverage in firms with low (high) information 
asymmetry between or among groups of external investors. 
In this paper, I utilize a unique regulatory shock to firms’ information 
environment (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, hereafter SOX) to empirically examine the 
relationship between asymmetric information and capital structure.  Congress passed 
SOX after a string of accounting scandals eroded the confidence of investors in U.S. 
markets.  In the early 2000s, several accounting scandals (e.g., Tyco, WorldCom, Enron), 
shook investors’ confidence in the U.S. markets.  Inaccurate financial statements misled 
atomistic investors, who suffered from a large information asymmetry relative to smart 
money and firm insiders.   
As a result, many atomistic investors and non-executive employees lost 
substantial portions of their life savings while executives landed safely into financial 
security via their golden parachutes.  The passage of SOX is consistent with Bebchuk and 
Neeman (2010), who predict that legislators will pass laws to protect investors in the 
wake of fraud.  SOX requires all U.S.-listed firms to take steps to accurately reveal 
relevant financial information so as to meet the Act’s goal of reducing the information 
asymmetry that outside investors face.  The requirements in SOX are intended to reduce 
information asymmetry in the U.S. markets by prescribing a set of rules with which all 
firms listed on a U.S. exchange must comply.   
I hypothesize that the reduction in information asymmetry associated with SOX 
may affect firms’ capital structure decisions.  The reduction in information asymmetry 
could lead to more debt use or more equity use, suggesting that either higher debt ratios 
or higher equity ratios may result.  One possibility is that firms’ long-term debt ratios will 
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change.  The logic is as follows.  Heflin and Hsu (2008) find that SOX is associated with 
more accurate financial information, defined as a greater use of reported earnings based 
on generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in computing permanent earnings.  
Since more accurate earnings are available to outside investors, their information set 
approaches that of insiders.  External investors are thus better informed about the intrinsic 
value of securities and will demand only those securities for which they believe they will 
be appropriately compensated.  To maximize proceeds from security issuance, managers 
will need to issue securities that investors prefer.  Since investors may prefer either debt 
or equity, long-term debt ratios may change after SOX.  However, since debt is cheaper 
than equity, I expect to observe a greater increase in the debt ratio. 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that SOX could be associated with a 
greater reliance on equity, leading to lower debt ratios.  Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) find 
that banks penalize firms that restate fraudulent earnings with stiffer loan terms.  
Stringent loan terms may lead managers to issue equity to fund projects, leading to lower 
debt ratios, particularly in the short term.  Boubakri and Ghouma (2008) document 
increased monitoring by investors and institutions in debt markets after SOX.  Tighter 
monitoring benefits investors via increased scrutiny during the lending process, but such 
monitoring can lead to higher costs of debt.  The reason for possibly higher costs of debt 
is that closer monitoring may reveal detrimental information about firms that wish to 
borrow funds, resulting in stiffer debt covenants (Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2008).  Thus, 
more intensive monitoring could lead managers to issue equity instead of debt if the cost 
of debt outweighs that of equity, lowering debt ratios.   
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Continuing with papers that suggest that SOX is associated with lower debt ratios, 
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) find that more firms use accrual-based earnings management 
prior to SOX but that more firms use real earnings management after SOX.  This result 
suggests that firms use more conservative accounting techniques after SOX, allowing 
investors to better understand the intrinsic value of the firm.  Thus, a lower cost of equity 
may result, leading to lower debt ratios.  Chang, Fernando, and Liao (2009) find that, 
after SOX, the market believes that earnings quality has improved and that the cost of 
equity has decreased.  Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond (2009) find that 
SOX’s enhanced standards for internal controls are associated with a lower cost of equity.  
These results may lead to greater equity use after SOX, suggesting lower debt ratios. 
On the other hand, other studies suggest that SOX is associated with higher debt 
ratios.  Although Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) suggest that debt ratios may fall in the short 
term, leverage use may increase in the long run.  The reason is that managers are likely to 
enforce conservative, accurate financial reporting in their firms since they will not wish 
the stiff loan terms to persist.  Greater earnings quality will result and may lead to less 
stringent loan terms, a lower cost of debt, greater debt use, and higher debt ratios. 
Continuing with papers that imply higher leverage after SOX, Andrade, Bernile, 
and Hood (2009) document lower opacity and debt costs associated with SOX, and 
Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) predict that lower opacity will lead to weaker debt 
covenants.  Also, Easley and O’Hara (2010) show that reducing ambiguity at the 
microstructure level benefits issuing firms via a lower cost of capital.  Their result also 
suggests that leverage ratios may rise after SOX.  In addition, Hail and Leuz (2009) find 
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that SOX is associated with lower costs of capital for firms cross-listed in the U.S.  This 
result also implies that debt will be cheaper post-SOX, leading to higher debt ratios.   
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Wintoki 
(2007), Zhang (2007), and Iliev (2009) find that SOX is associated with net costs or 
lower market value, either for all firms in general or for small firms in particular.  In 
addition, Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman (2008) find that SOX is associated with greater 
market risk, idiosyncratic risk, and variance of total returns because the Act requires 
firms to reveal negative information.  If managers do not wish to further lower stock 
prices by issuing new equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984) in the wake of greater levels of 
adverse information in the market and lower market value, they will follow the pecking-
order model, leading to higher long-term debt ratios. 
Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) imply that SOX may be associated with 
noisier stock prices.  They argue that, since market prices reflect firm fundamentals as 
well as expected corrective action from regulators, SOX might make it more difficult to 
derive information about firms’ fundamentals from stock prices.  Noisier prices may lead 
investors to prefer relatively safer debt, which stipulates principal and interest payments.  
If managers prefer debt to equity, leverage ratios will rise.   
Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010) find that SOX is associated with a decrease in 
risk-taking.  This result implies that managers may pass up some positive net-present-
value (NPV) projects after SOX that they would not have passed up before SOX.  Passing 
up positive NPV projects will result in lower firm value (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Also, 
Baranchuk and Dybvig (2010) find that SOX might not result in greater incentives for 
managers to maximize shareholder value, suggesting that the market prices of common 
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shares will not be maximized.  As a result, managers may be more inclined to issue debt 
to fund projects, leading to higher leverage ratios. 
In addition, some authors suggest that the effect of SOX on capital structure is 
inconclusive.  Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007) argue that SOX might not lead to more 
accurate financial statements, meaning that the accuracy of financial statements could 
remain the same or even deteriorate.  In their model, managers approach investors for 
financing for good or bad projects.  To determine good from bad projects, investors can 
either rely on noisy, publicly-available information or incur search costs for more reliable 
information.  Managers with bad projects might artificially enhance the attractiveness of 
the expected financials of those projects.  At least one investor may finance the project if 
the financials appear sufficiently attractive.  If financial statement accuracy remains 
unchanged, leverage ratios may rise or fall depending on the relative cost of debt to that 
of equity.  If financial statements become less accurate after SOX, firms’ cost of capital 
may increase, in accordance with Gao (2010).  This situation will lead to higher debt 
ratios if the cost of debt is lower than that of equity or if managers prefer to follow the 
pecking-order model.  On the other hand, debt ratios may decrease, as managers may 
decide to issue equity to finance the firm if the cost of debt is prohibitively high.   
Patterson and Smith (2007) find improved auditing and control, leading to more 
accurate financial statements.  More accurate financial statements may lead to lower costs 
of debt (equity), resulting in higher (lower) leverage ratios.  Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010) 
find that firms use higher discount rates to evaluate projects after SOX.  This result 
suggests that managers expect the cost of external funds, whether debt or equity, to 
increase after SOX.  This situation could result in higher debt ratios since the cost of debt 
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is typically less than that of equity.  On the other hand, lower debt ratios could result if 
managers prefer equity to debt. 
To examine the effect of asymmetric information on capital structure, I use a 
sample of U.S.-listed firms from both the U.S. and Canada since all U.S.-listed firms are 
subject to SOX.  The control group in this study consists of Canadian firms based in 
Canada since those firms are not subject to SOX.  To analyze subsamples, I decompose 
the test group into (1) firms headquartered and traded in the U.S. and (2) firms 
headquartered in Canada but cross-listed in the U.S.  All analyses, including differences-
in-differences as well as regression, are conducted with respect to the control group so 
that the effect of SOX on U.S.-listed firms can be cleanly separated. 
To test whether or not the capital structures of U.S.- versus Canada-listed firms 
differ after SOX, I separate firms into four categories.  The first category consists of the 
control group – Canadian firms listed in Canada.  The second category consists of U.S. 
firms listed in the U.S.  The third category of firms used in this analysis is comprised of 
Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S.  SOX applies to firms in the second and third 
categories because those firms, whether headquartered in the U.S. or Canada, are listed 
on a U.S. exchange.  The fourth category, the union of firms in the second and third 
categories, consists of all U.S.-listed firms and is clearly subject to SOX. 
Using t-tests based on differences-in-differences relative to Canadian firms listed 
in Canada, I find that SOX is associated with changes in capital structure.  Differences in 
the book long-term debt ratios of U.S.- versus Canada-listed firms are greater after SOX 
compared to before SOX.  This result is largely driven by U.S. firms listed in the U.S.  
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Overall, post-SOX differences in capital structure of Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. and Canadian firms listed in Canada do not differ based on t-tests.   
In addition to conducting t-tests, I regress levels of and changes in long-term debt 
ratios against firms and market characteristics.  When levels of long-term debt ratios are 
regressed on firm and market characteristics, I find that, after SOX, U.S.-listed firms have 
higher debt ratios than Canadian firms listed in Canada.  U.S.-based firms that are listed 
in the U.S. drive this result.  Long-term debt ratios do not change for Canadian firms 
cross-listed in the U.S.  When changes in levels of long-term debt ratios are regressed on 
firm and market characteristics, I find that, in the SOX era, firms do not alter the rate of 
change in their long-term debt ratios.  For completeness, I also examine changes in book 
equity ratios after SOX.  SOX is not associated with changes in levels or rates of change 
in equity ratios. 
In addition to examining SOX’s impact on changes in long-term debt ratios, I 
analyze SOX’s effect on changes in equity and short-term debt ratios.  The reason is that, 
in addition to simply issuing long-term debt, higher long-term debt ratios may result from 
reducing equity or short-term debt.  I find that SOX is associated with greater positive 
changes in short-term leverage, suggesting that firms take on short-term leverage at a 
faster rate after SOX compared to before SOX.  One possible explanation is that firms 
hire new permanent employees or outside consultants to adjust reporting systems for 
compliance with SOX’s provisions.  Since firms often undertake short-term loans to 
finance payroll, the increase in the change in short-term debt may reflect this 
phenomenon. 
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Since SOX requires firms to reveal harmful information (Akhigbe, Martin, and 
Newman 2008), SOX’s effect on capital structure should be directly related to earnings 
management prior to its passage.  Graham, Li, and Qiu (2010) find that banks stiffen loan 
terms for firms that restate earnings because of prior fraud.  This result suggests that 
firms that heavily manage earnings prior to SOX should be most affected by the Act 
because those firms will most drastically restate earnings after SOX.  Once investors 
learn of the highly managed earnings, they will punish those firms with lower stock 
prices.  If the cost of debt for firms that restate fraudulent earnings remains lower than the 
cost of equity, long-term debt ratios may increase after SOX.   
To account for earnings management, I identify firms that SOX is most likely to 
affect based on earnings management prior to passage of the Act.  One measure of 
earnings management used in this analysis is discretionary accruals, which include items 
that managers have latitude in marking up or down.  Discretionary accruals can affect 
several accounts, including such uncollected items as accounts receivable or the 
allowance for doubtful accounts as well as such unpaid items as salaries and interest.   
Lower discretionary accruals may be associated with changes in financing 
decisions after SOX.  One possibility is that debt ratios fall.  This case is possible because 
reducing accruals will increase the amount charged against revenue, leading to lower net 
operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).  
Lower NOPAT and EBIT imply that a firm is less able to meet financial obligations.  
Potential lenders will notice that situation and will be less willing to buy bonds from that 
firm.  As a result, the firm will need to issue equity to finance new growth, leading to a 
higher cost of equity.  With more equity financing, the firm’s debt ratio will fall.  The 
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second way that lower discretionary accruals can affect capital structure is via higher debt 
ratios.  Managers of firms with low stock prices due to earnings restatements arising from 
greater disclosure after SOX may choose not to further depress their stock prices by 
issuing more equity (Myers and Majluf 1984) and opt for debt financing. 
Using the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (KLM 2005) model to measure earnings 
management, I find that firms that manage earnings aggressively (modestly) decrease 
(increase) their leverage ratios post-SOX.  Firms are said to aggressively manage 
earnings if their ratio of unexplained to total accruals equals or exceeds the median value.  
Listing status does not affect firms that aggressively manage earnings prior to SOX, 
possibly because the market punishes firms for earnings management without regard to 
the country of listing.  However, firms that modestly manage earnings prior to SOX tend 
to increase their long-term debt ratios. 
This paper contributes to three aspects of the finance and accounting literature.  
First, this analysis adds to the literature that examines the interplay between firms’ 
information environment and their capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988;  Easley and O’Hara, 2004;  Agarwal and O’Hara, 2008).  By using SOX 
to represent an exogenous change in firms’ information environment, I am able to 
overcome the potential endogeneity between information environment and capital 
structure.  As such, I document higher post-SOX long-term debt ratios of U.S. firms 
listed in the U.S. but no change in the debt ratios of Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
U.S., relative to a control group of firms (Canadian firms listed in Canada).   
Second, this paper also adds to the literature on the effect of exogenous regulatory 
change on investors or managers (Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos, 2002; Greenstone, 
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Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2005;  Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005;  Gomes, Gorton, and 
Madureira, 2007) by documenting the effect of SOX on managers’ financing patterns.  
Third, this analysis contributes to the large literature on SOX (e.g., Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, 2003;  Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007;  Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2009) for straightforward reasons. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the data 
used in this analysis.  Section 2 presents the methodology and data.  Section 3 contains 
empirical results.  Section 4 contains robustness tests.  Section 5 concludes. 
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Chapter Two:  Data 
 The data set used in this analysis consists of firm-quarters that meet the following 
criteria:  (1) in Compustat from 2000 to 2004, (2) active, (3) not an American Depository 
Receipt (ADR) or foreign government, (4) positive and non-missing book value of assets, 
book value of debt, and revenue, (5) headquartered in either the U.S. or Canada, (6) 
traded in the U.S. or Canada, (7) non-negative quarterly closing prices, and (8) not a 
utility (SIC codes 4000-4999) or financial firm (SIC codes 6000-6999).  Since the cross-
listed Canadian firms used in this study are traded on U.S. exchanges and are not 
represented by indirect ownership of shares held on deposit in a Canadian bank, the 
cross-listed Canadian firms are not ADRs. 
 The U.S. exchanges included in this analysis are the New York, American, and 
Boston Stock Exchanges, the Midwest, Pacific, and Philadelphia Exchanges, the Over-
the-Counter Bulletin Board, and the NASDAQ-NMS Stock Market.  The Toronto, 
Montreal, Canadian Venture, and Alberta Stock Exchanges in Canada are used. 
 14
 
Chapter Three:  Approach and Variables 
 The goal of this analysis is to test pre- and post-SOX differences in the capital 
structure of firms traded in the U.S. versus those headquartered and traded in Canada.  I 
measure capital structure based on the book long-term debt ratio, defined as the ratio of 
the book value of long-term debt to the book value of total assets.  I use long-term debt 
because it more closely reflects substantial financing and, unlike total debt, is not subject 
to short-term fluctuations in borrowing (e.g., for payroll).  The null and alternative 
hypotheses for long-term debt use after SOX are below. 
H0:  The post-SOX long-term debt ratios of U.S.-listed firms, whether based in the 
U.S. or Canada, do not differ from those of Canadian firms listed in Canada. 
H1:  The post-SOX long-term debt ratios of U.S.-listed firms, whether based in the 
U.S. or Canada, differ from those of Canadian firms listed in Canada. 
To test the above hypotheses, I segment the data into four categories and use both 
static and differences-in-differences approaches.  The first category consists of firms 
headquartered and traded in Canada.  These firms are considered the control group 
because they are not subject to SOX.  SOX applies only to firms listed in the U.S., 
regardless of where the firms are headquartered.  The second category consists of U.S.-
based firms listed in the U.S.  The third category is comprised of Canadian firms cross-
listed in the U.S.  The fourth category is composed of all firms listed in the U.S., 
regardless of where they are based.  Thus, the fourth category of firms consists of firms in 
the second and third categories.  Firms in the second, third and fourth categories are 
subject to SOX because they are listed on a U.S. exchange. 
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Segmenting the sample in the above manner facilitates testing SOX’s impact on 
all U.S.-listed firms in my sample as well as specific categories of firms (i.e., Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the U.S and U.S.-based firms listed in the U.S.).  Comparing the 
long-term debt ratios of firms in the control group (Canadian firms based and traded in 
Canada) with those of the fourth category (all firms traded in the U.S., whether based in 
the U.S. or Canada) tests the overall effect of SOX.  Also, comparing the debt ratios of 
firms in the control group with those of the second (U.S.-based firms listed in the U.S.) 
and third categories (Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S.) tests the effect of SOX on 
specific categories of firms listed on a U.S. exchange.   
If SOX increases the level of unfavorable information in the market, lower stock 
prices and managerial reluctance to finance projects externally via debt or equity may 
result.  However, if managers decide to raise capital externally after SOX, I expect them 
to prefer debt to equity as the pecking-order model states.  The reason is that, since stock 
prices are already lower due to the release of harmful information, managers will not 
wish to conduct SEOs to further lower their firms’ stock prices (Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  This expectation holds particularly for firms that highly managed earnings before 
SOX since those firms take strong measures to smooth earnings.  Since SOX is 
associated with more conservative earnings (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008), the reported 
earnings of firms that highly manage earnings before SOX will differ greatly after SOX.  
Ceteris paribus, greater earnings volatility will lead to greater changes in share prices 
than for firms that manage earnings lightly prior to SOX.  Clearly, managers of high-
earnings-management firms will be less willing to conduct SEOs in the wake of lower 
prices post-SOX. 
 16
 Firm fixed effects may exist in the raw data because some firm characteristics 
change little in successive quarters.  Such clustering of values of an independent variable 
leads to low standard errors, high t-statistics, and an overstated effect of that variable on 
the dependent variable.  An example of firm fixed effects relates to capital structure itself, 
as debt ratios typically do not change much from one quarter to the next.  Another 
example of firm fixed effects relates to dividends, as Lintner (1956) finds that dividends 
are sticky because managers tend to raise the dividend only when they believe that higher 
earnings can be sustained for the foreseeable future.   
 To address firm fixed effects that may exist in levels and ratios, I regress average 
capital structures on the average values of firm characteristics (Kennedy 2003).  More 
specifically, I average each firm’s pre- and post-SOX observations, resulting in one pre-
SOX and one post-SOX observation per firm.  I then regress average pre- and post-SOX 
long-term debt ratios on each firm’s average characteristics. 
 To examine changes in financing patterns, I regress changes in quarterly long-
term debt ratios on changes in firm characteristics.  Since using changes introduces 
variability, fixed effects are mitigated via this approach. 
Similar to models used in Meyer (1995), Leary (2009), and others, I estimate the 
model below in both static and differences-in-differences approaches: 
D/Ait = b0 + b1 SOXt + b2 LISTING + b3 SOX*LISTING + b4 X’i,t-1B + b5 Z’t-1C + εit  (1) 
 The coefficient of primary interest is b3, which captures the variation in debt 
ratios arising from SOX based on listing location relative to Canadian firms listed in 
Canada.  The coefficient b1 reflects changes in the debt ratio over the pre- and post-SOX 
periods that (1) are common to the control and test firms and (2) would exist even in the 
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absence of SOX.  The coefficient b2 reflects differences (before the passing of SOX) in 
the mean debt ratio between two groups of firms.  The sample of firms remains the same 
before and after SOX, reducing biases due to changes in the sample. 
D/At, the book long-term debt ratio at time t, is the dependent variable.  SOX is a 
dummy variable that equals one for all time periods on or after July 30, 2002, (the 
passage date of SOX) and zero otherwise.  SOX is subscripted with “t” to highlight the 
time dimension.  LISTING takes on one of three values:  U.S.-LISTED, U.S. IN U.S., 
and X-LISTED.  U.S.-LISTED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed on a 
U.S. exchange, regardless of whether the firm is based in the U.S. or Canada.  Otherwise, 
U.S.-LISTED equals zero.  U.S. IN U.S.  is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is 
both based and listed in the U.S.  Otherwise, U.S. IN U.S. equals zero.  X-LISTED is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm is based in Canada and cross-listed in the U.S.  
Otherwise, X-LISTED equals zero. 
Xit-1 is a matrix of firm characteristics that vary over time, while Zt-1 contains 
market and macroeconomic variables.  The variables contained in those matrices are 
described in detail below. 
VWMKTRET is the lagged (i.e., at time t-1) value-weighted market return, 
excluding dividends, found in CRSP.  Shiller (1990) hypothesizes that the equity market 
is susceptible to investors’ over-optimism, which leads investors to increase their demand 
for shares, bidding up prices.  Supporting Shiller’s (1990) hypothesis, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995, 1997) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that managers try to issue 
overpriced stock when the market is hot.  In addition, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find 
that a window of opportunity exists for SEOs, suggesting that managers conduct SEOs 
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while conditions are favorable (i.e., strong equity market).  As a result, I expect a high 
(low) market return to be associated with more (less) equity financing and lower (higher) 
long-term debt ratios.   
To measure cash-flow commitment, I use the natural log of total dividends paid 
(DIV), computed as the quarter-end dividend per share times the number of outstanding 
common shares.  The extent to which a firm’s cash flows are committed to suppliers of 
capital can impact whether or not it raises external capital in general and, more 
specifically, whether it issues debt or common equity.  For example, if a firm has a high 
dividend, its managers might decide not to issue more stock so that additional dividend 
payments will not burden the firm.  If a firm has a low dividend, its managers might 
decide to issue additional equity because the existing dividend level may not be 
burdensome.   
Firm size is measured in two ways.  One variable is SIZE, the natural log of the 
market value of assets at time t-1.  The market value of assets equals the sum of the 
market values of debt and equity.  The book value of debt is used to proxy for the market 
value of debt, and the market value of equity is the quarter-end number of outstanding 
shares multiplied by that quarter’s closing share price.  Another proxy for firm size is 
REVENUE, defined as the natural log of revenue at time t-1.   
 GROWTH controls for a firm’s status as value or growth.  Value or growth status 
is based on Tobin’s q, defined as the market-to-book ratio of total assets.  GROWTH 
equals one if Tobin’s q exceeds one (i.e., if the firm is a growth firm) and zero otherwise.  
Whenever the market value of assets is used, I sum the market values of debt and equity, 
where the market value of equity is computed as the product of the quarter-end number of 
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outstanding shares and price of common stock.  I approximate the market value of debt 
by its book value. 
To control for the interest-rate environment, I include the variable INTRATE10T, 
which measures the contemporaneous rate on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note during a 
quarter.  I use the 10-year Treasury note rate to proxy for the investment environment 
because a 10-year period is an appropriate intermediate horizon that reflects both short- 
and long-term investment horizons. 
The primary measure of earnings management, EARNMGMT, is the natural log 
of unexplained accruals at time t-1.  Unexplained accruals are defined as the residuals 
from the Kothari, Leone, and Watts (KLW, 2005) model.  The KLW (2005) model builds 
on the Jones (1991) earnings-management model by controlling for the ratio of net 
income to total assets, where net income can be defined in either lagged or 
contemporaneous terms.1  Since other numerators in the model are defined 
contemporaneously, I use contemporaneous net income as well.  The KLW (2005) model 
is shown below: 
TAi,t/Ai,t-1 = β0i 1/Ai,t-1 + β1i ∆REVi,t/Ait-1 + β2i PPEi,t/Ai,t-1 + β3i NIi,t/Ai,t-1 + εi,t   (2) 
In the Jones (1991) model, total accruals are defined as the change in non-cash 
working capital before income taxes payable minus total depreciation expense.  
Formulaically, total accruals for each firm in each quarter, TAi,t, are computed as 
∆Current Assetsi,t – ∆Cashi,t – ∆Current Liabilitiesi,t + ∆Current Maturities of Long-Term 
Debti,t + ∆Income Taxes Payablei,t – Depreciation and Amortization Expensei,t, where the 
first five terms are the change in current assets, cash, current liabilities, long-term debt, 
                                                 
1 For more earnings management models, see Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1996), Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005, 2006, 2008). 
 20
and income taxes payable from period t-1 to period t, and Depreciation and Amortization 
Expenset is the value incurred during period t.  Ai,t-1 is the book value of total assets for 
firm i at time t-1.  ∆REVi,t is the change in revenue for firm i from period t-1 to t.  PPEi,t 
is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i at time t.  NIi,t-1 is lagged net income 
(i.e., at time t-1) for firm i.   
Larger values of the residual term εi,t indicate larger unexplained portions of total 
accruals.  In accordance with the aforementioned papers on earnings management, I 
determine the firms within each industry that manage earnings more than their industry 
average before SOX.  Each industry is defined as a one-thousand-value range of SIC 
codes.  For example, the SIC range from 3000 to 3999 is defined as one industry, while 
the SIC code range 5000 to 5999 is defined as another industry.   
I also estimate a model that uses changes in debt ratios as well as the controls 
described earlier in this paper.  To examine the way financing patterns change on a 
quarterly basis, I regress quarterly changes in the book long-term debt ratio against 
quarterly changes from t-1 to t in the control variables described in Model (1).   
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Chapter Four:  Results 
 Table 1 summarizes the data and presents the results of t-tests of differences 
relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada, the control group in this study.  The data set 
consists mostly of U.S. firms listed on a U.S. exchange, while Canadian firms cross-listed 
in the U.S. comprise the smallest number of firms.     
In terms of the variable of interest, the long-term book debt ratio, U.S. firms listed 
in the U.S. have an average ratio of 22%.  This value is greater than the debt ratio for 
Canadian firms listed in Canada, which have an average ratio of 19%.  All firms listed in 
the U.S., whether based in the U.S. or Canada, have an average long-term book debt ratio 
of 21%, which exceeds that of the control group.  However, the book long-term debt 
ratios of Canadian firms cross-listed on a U.S. exchange do not differ from those of 
Canadian firms listed in Canada.  Firms in the control group are smaller than firms in the 
other categories with respect to market value of assets, book value of assets, and growth 
as measured by the market-to-book ratio. 
 Table 2 presents pre- and post-SOX long-term book debt ratios and the results of 
t-tests of differences relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada, the control group.  The 
overall point of Table 2 is that the debt ratios of U.S. firms listed in the U.S. as well as all 
U.S.-listed firms, whether based in Canada or the U.S., exceed those of Canadian firms 
listed in Canada both pre- and post-SOX.  The pre- and post-SOX debt ratios for 
Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. generally do not differ from those of Canadian 
firms listed in Canada.   
 22
Panel A shows that, overall, the long-term debt ratios for all firms listed in the 
U.S. are higher than those for Canadian firms listed in Canada both pre- and post-SOX.  
Also, the differences in debt ratios of Canadian firms listed in Canada and those of all 
U.S.-listed firms are driven by U.S. firms listed in the U.S.  Similar results hold overall 
for Panel B, which breaks out firms by Tobin’s q, defined as the market-to-book value of 
assets. 
Although not shown, t-tests of long-term leverage ratios within each group (i.e., 
the pre-SOX debt ratio for Canadian firms listed in Canada vs. the post-SOX debt ratio 
for that group) are insignificant.  This result implies that, in the univariate case, the long-
term debt ratios of each group do not change after SOX. 
A greater number of firms in the pre-SOX period in Panel B, which breaks out 
firms by the market-to-book ratio of assets, means that more firms transition from value 
to growth status in the pre-SOX period, implying that fewer firms become growth firms 
in the post-SOX period.  A lower number of growth firms post-SOX may imply that 
fewer firms take risky positive-net-present-value projects, supporting the argument that 
SOX is associated with lower risk-taking (Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter, 2010). 
Table 3 contains univariate results of t-tests of quarterly changes in different 
combinations of U.S.-listed firms relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada (the control 
group) during the pre- and post-SOX periods.  The main point of Table 3 is that, prior to 
SOX, U.S.-listed firms increase their quarterly debt ratios on average, leading to the 
higher debt ratios shown in Table 2.  U.S. firms headquartered and listed in the U.S. drive 
this result. 
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For example, Panel A of Table 3 shows that, prior to SOX, all U.S.-listed firms 
experience an average quarterly increase of five basis points (0.0005) relative to the 
control firms, which lower their debt ratios by 60 basis points (-0.0060).  U.S. firms listed 
in the U.S. drive this result, as those firms raise their pre-SOX long-term debt ratios by 
nine basis points (0.0009) while Canadian firms cross listed in the U.S. change their debt 
ratios in a fashion similar to the control firms.  Since small firms (i.e, with a market 
capitalization not exceeding $1 billion) listed in the U.S. lower their long-term debt ratios 
by eight basis points (-0.0008) per quarter, large U.S. firms traded in the U.S. drive the 
above results. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that U.S.-listed growth firms, led by those 
headquartered in the U.S., increase their long-term leverage on a quarterly basis relative 
to Canadian firms listed in Canada.  Both Panels A and B show that no difference in 
capital structure change exists for any subgroup relative to control firms. 
Table 4 contains results of multivariate regressions of levels of debt ratios against 
market and firm characteristics.  The results generally confirm the pattern found in the 
univariate results in Tables 2 and 3.  The main point of Table 4 is that, when controlling 
for several factors that influence debt ratios, U.S.-listed firms increase their long-term 
debt ratios after SOX relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada (the control group).  
U.S.-based and -listed firms drive this result.  The long-term debt ratios of Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. do not change relative to control firms.  An explanation is 
that cross-listed firms may choose to report earnings based on Canadian GAAP, U.S. 
GAAP, or International Accounting Standards (IAS) GAAP (Rouse, 2003).  Because of 
the lack of conformity among various accounting rule sets, cross-listed firms have more 
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latitude in reporting their earnings, which might be perceived as smoother compared to 
U.S.-based firms, which use U.S. GAAP rules.2  
In Table 4, Models (1) and (2), which compare the long-term debt ratios of all 
U.S.-listed firms (whether based in the U.S. or Canada) to the control firms, show that, in 
the SOX era, firms listed in the U.S. on average have higher long-term leverage ratios.  
The interaction term, SOX*U.S.-LISTED, indicates that U.S.-listed firms have long-term 
debt ratios after SOX that differ from pre-SOX levels.  The magnitude of the increase in 
long-term debt ratios is 2.3 to 3.2 percentage points, depending on the model estimated.  
In Models (3) and (4), the interaction term, SOX*U.S. IN U.S., shows that, in the SOX 
era, U.S.-based firms that are listed in the U.S. have higher long-term debt ratios by 2.6 
or 3.2 percentage points, depending on the model used, relative to control firms.  
However, in Models (5) and (6), the interaction term, SOX*X-LISTED, shows that, after 
SOX, Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. do not change their long-term debt ratio 
levels compared to control firms. 
The stand-alone variable SOX captures the general change in the level of long-
term debt ratios for all firms after SOX.  All models in Table 4 indicate that, for the 
average firm in the sample (including both control and test firms), there is no change in 
the long-term debt ratio after SOX.  This result follows from the insignificance of the 
dummy variable SOX.  Also, across all models, the lagged level of dividends (DIV) is 
directly related to long-term leverage.  This finding makes sense because, as managers 
commit more of a firm’s profits to paying dividends, they signal the strength of their 
                                                 
2 John Kelly, Audit Partner at the Canadian accounting firm of Scarrow and Donald LLP, suggests that 
different accounting standards lack general conformity and argues in favor of uniform accounting rules 
worldwide.  See http://www.acsbcanada.org/documents/item19697.pdf. 
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firms’ cash flows.  Cash-flow strength will make a firm more attractive to lenders, likely 
increasing leverage.   
Table 4 also shows that the 10-year Treasury rate (INTRATE10T) does not affect 
leverage ratios over the sample period.  This result requires explanation.  Typically, a 
negative relationship between the interest rate environment and leverage might be 
expected because lower rates make debt cheaper, increasing its attractiveness.  However, 
the lack of a relationship between leverage and the interest rate found in this study can be 
explained as follows.  The sample period, which runs from 2000 to 2004, covers a period 
during which consumers’ expectations about the U.S. economy waned.  Although Figure 
1 shows that the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ (NAPM) Index (now 
known as the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) Index) remains below 50 – 
indicating an economic slowdown – for much of the sample period prior to the end of 
2003, the Index rises and remains above 50 for all of 2004, suggesting a more vibrant 
economy for the latter part of the sample.  However, Figure 2 shows that the University 
of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index falls over the period from 2000 to 2004, 
indicating consumers’ declining confidence in the U.S. economy.  Declining consumer 
sentiment manifests itself in less consumer spending and affects businesses via lower 
cash flows.  Lower cash inflows mean that a firm’s ability to repay debt is reduced.  This 
situation will lead many firms to refrain from borrowing. 
Table 4 shows that growth firms are associated with less debt, based on the 
negative coefficient for GROWTH.  This finding is consistent with Titman and Wessels 
(1988), who find that growth firms prefer the flexible use of proceeds from equity 
offerings.  In addition, high earnings management prior to SOX (EARNMGMT) is 
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associated with lower long-term debt ratios.  One reason is that, after the market punishes 
guilty firms with lower stock prices after learning about misreported earnings (e.g., Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Michaley, Thaler, and Womack, 1995), managers of 
those firms may need to better position those firms to raise capital.  Managers can do that 
by lowering the percentage of long-term debt and, simultaneously, interest payments so 
that lenders will not point out the firm’s high leverage as a deterrent to lending to the 
firm.  Also, making a firm attractive to lenders so that low-priced shares will not need to 
be issued to finance the firm is consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions of changes in long-term debt ratios 
before and after SOX.  The results of Table 5 need to be interpreted in light of Table 4.  
Recall that Table 4 shows that, relative to the control firms, all U.S.-listed firms in 
general – and U.S.-based and -listed firms in particular – have higher long-term leverage 
ratios after SOX.  The main point of Table 5 is that, after SOX, relative to Canadian firms 
listed in Canada, U.S.-listed firms in the aggregate do not change the rate of increase in 
their long-term debt ratios.  This result is shown via the interaction term, SOX*U.S.-
LISTED.  This result also holds for the two subgroups – namely, U.S.-based and -listed 
firms as well as Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S, as shown by SOX*U.S. IN U.S. 
and SOX*X-LISTED, respectively.  Also, in all models in Table 5, the stand-alone 
variable SOX indicates that all firms in the sample (whether control or test firms) do not 
change the rate of change in their long-term debt ratios compared to before SOX.   
Table 6 shows quarterly changes in long-term debt ratios surrounding SOX and is 
useful in explaining the lack of significance of the interaction terms in Table 5.  
Consistent with Bebchuk and Neeman (2010), Table 6 suggests that managers increased 
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leverage in anticipation of SOX.  Table 6 shows that all firms in the sample increase 
leverage from time t-3 to time t-2, where time t is the quarter in which SOX is ratified.  
Although firms decrease leverage from t-2 to t-1, the net change for long-term leverage is 
positive leading up to time t.  This result also holds for all U.S.-listed firms and is driven 
by U.S.-based and -listed firms.  However, Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. and 
their Canada-listed counterparts reduce leverage prior to SOX. 
Table 7 shows the results of the regressions of changes in short-term debt ratios 
before and after SOX.  Analyzing short-term debt use is important because firms may 
decide to issue short-term debt instead of long-term debt.  Flannery (1986) argues that 
firms with lower information asymmetry will be less concerned than firms with high 
information asymmetry about signaling their value via issuing debt of a specific maturity, 
making those firms more likely to issue long-term debt.  However, if SOX reduces 
information asymmetry in the overall market, making firms more transparent in general, 
firms could issue greater amounts of short-term debt for the same reason that they might 
issue long-term debt. 
Table 7 shows that the stand-alone variable SOX and the interaction terms alone 
do not explain short-term debt use.  This result is not surprising since short-term debt is 
less sensitive to information asymmetry compared to long-term debt.  The interaction 
terms suggest that, after SOX, a firm’s listing location does not affect its short-term debt 
use. 
For completeness, I also examine changes in book equity ratios after SOX.  
Managers might substitute equity for debt if the cost of debt is too high or if they wish to 
lower their firms’ debt ratios.  Although not shown, no sub-group of firms – control 
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firms, U.S.-listed firms, U.S.-based and -listed firms, or Canadian firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. – changes its rate of change in book equity ratios post-SOX. 
Table 8 contains regression results based on earnings management prior to SOX.  
The sample is broken out into firms that manage earnings aggressively versus modestly 
before SOX.  A firm is said to aggressively manage earnings if its ratio of unexplained 
accruals to total accruals exceeds 50%.  For high-earnings-management firms, the 
dummy variable SOX is generally associated with lower leverage for all firms in the 
sample.  While the interaction (difference-in-difference) terms alone do not explain 
leverage use for high-earnings-management firms after SOX, the interaction terms 
explain higher leverage use in low-earnings-management firms after SOX. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
 
 
         MV Assets BV Assets Debt 
Listing Status      N (in US$ bil.) (in US$ bil.) Ratio  M/B  
CAN Firms    579 0.53  0.39  0.19  1.83  
   Listed in CAN 
 
U.S. Firms   2324 3.91*** 1.77*** 0.22*** 2.55*** 
  Listed in the U.S. 
 
CAN Firms    129 2.15*** 1.37*** 0.18  2.42*** 
  Cross-Listed  
  in the U.S. 
 
All Firms Listed 2453 3.82*** 1.74*** 0.21*** 2.54*** 
  in the U.S. 
 
All   3032 3.19  1.49  0.21  2.41  
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Table 2 – Pre- versus Post-SOX Debt Ratios 
 
Panel A – Breakout by Market Value of Assets 
             Pre-SOX       Post-SOX 
CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms 
MV  Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in 
($ Bil.)  CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. 
 < 1  0.18  0.18  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.13**  0.18 
  (533)  (1733)  (100)  (1833)  (525)  (1688)  (96)  (1784) 
 
> 1  0.30  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.28  0.29 
  (73)  (984)  (48)  (1032)  (80)  (904)  (47)  (951) 
 
All  0.19  0.21**  0.21  0.21**  0.18  0.22*** 0.18  0.22*** 
  (606)  (2717)  (148)  (2865)  (605)  (2592)  (143)  (2735) 
 
Panel B – Breakout by Tobin’s Q 
Pre-SOX       Post-SOX 
CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms 
Value/  Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in 
Growth  CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. 
Value    0.18  0.22*** 0.19  0.22*** 0.17  0.21*** 0.13  0.21*** 
  (q < 1) (267)  (882)  (47)  (929)  (219)  (735)  (33)  (768) 
 
Growth  0.19  0.21**  0.18  0.21**  0.18  0.22*** 0.19  0.22*** 
  (q > 1) (515)  (2245)  (122)  (2367)  (505)  (2222)  (125)  (2347) 
 
All  0.19  0.22*** 0.19  0.21*** 0.18  0.22*** 0.18  0.21*** 
  (782)  (3127)  (169)  (3296)  (724)  (2957)  (158)  (3115) 
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Table 3 – Changes in Debt Ratios 
 
Panel A – Breakout by Market Value of Assets 
             Pre-SOX       Post-SOX 
CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms 
MV  Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in 
($ Bil.)  CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. 
 < 1  -0.0080  -0.0003 * -0.0091  -0.0008 * -0.0040  -0.0006  0.0003  -0.0006 
  (533)  (1733)  (100)  (1833)  (525)  (1688)  (96)  (1784) 
 
> 1  0.0087  0.0031  -0.0040  0.0028  0.0007  -0.0009  0.0087  -0.0005 
  (73)  (984)  (48)  (1032)  (80)  (904)  (47)  (951) 
 
All  -0.0060  0.0009** -0.0074  0.0005** -0.0034  -0.0007  0.0031  -0.0005 
  (606)  (2717)  (148)  (2865)  (605)  (2592)  (143)  (2735) 
 
Panel B – Breakout by Tobin’s Q 
Pre-SOX       Post-SOX 
CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms CAN Firms U.S. Firms CAN Firms All Firms 
Value/  Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in Listed  in Listed in Cross-Listed Listed in 
Growth  CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. CAN  the U.S. in the U.S. the U.S. 
Value    0.0007  -0.0032  -0.0084  -0.0035  0.0007  0.0009  0.0022  0.0009 
  (q < 1) (267)  (882)  (47)  (929)  (219)  (735)  (33)  (768) 
 
Growth  -0.0066  0.0009** -0.0080  0.0004* 0.0037  -0.0011  0.0027  -0.0009 
  (q > 1) (515)  (2245)  (122)  (2367)  (505)  (2222)  (125)  (2347) 
 
All  -0.0041  -0.0003  -0.0081  -0.0007  -0.0023  -0.0006  0.0026  -0.0004 
  (782)  (3127)  (169)  (3296)  (724)  (2957)  (158)  (3115) 
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Table 4 – Regressions of Long-Term Debt Ratios 
 
                     Relative to Control Group (Canadian Firms Listed in Canada) 
Dependent Variable:  All U.S.-Listed Firms  U.S. Firms Listed in U.S.  Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in U.S. 
BLTD    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept        0.151*** 0.076     0.092*  0.126**  0.068  -0.068 
                (2.93)        (1.51)  (1.75)  (2.36)   (0.72)  (-0.73) 
 
SOX                -0.009  -0.016        -0.017  -0.008   -0.009  -0.010 
                (-0.79)        (-1.45)  (-1.52)  (-0.65)   (-0.74)  (-0.86) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   0.001  -0.019**    
    (0.09)  (-2.10)    
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  0.023*  0.032*** 
    (1.91)  (2.67) 
 
U.S. IN U.S.       -0.017*  0.011 
        (-1.89)  (1.20) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.      0.032*** 0.026** 
        (2.63)  (2.09) 
 
X-LISTED            -0.028*  -0.032* 
             (-1.68)  (-1.94) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED           0.019  0.021 
             (0.85)  (0.93) 
 
DIV               0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.040***  0.024*** 0.030*** 
               (6.24)  (5.89)  (5.52)  (16.19)   (3.41)  (4.69) 
 
INTRATE10T   1.417  1.303  1.028  1.745   2.458  3.776* 
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    (1.34)  (1.25)  (0.95)  (1.58)   (1.25)  (1.94) 
  
GROWTH   -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.031***  -0.005  -0.009 
    (-5.78)  (-6.77)  (-6.83)  (-3.79)   (-0.38)  (-0.72) 
 
MKTRET   -0.624** -0.604** -0.595** -0.658**  -0.684  -0.550 
    (-2.32)  (-2.28)  (-2.17)  (-2.35)   (-1.55)  (-1.25) 
 
EARNMGMT   -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.046***  -0.094*** -0.096*** 
    (-4.77)  (-4.60)  (-4.59)  (-4.70)   (-7.97)  (-8.11) 
 
PROFITABILITY  0.022***        0.030***    
    (11.37)         (7.04)    
 
MKTVAL     0.022*** 0.022***      0.020*** 
      (15.85)  (15.11)       (7.13) 
   
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p = 0.0695 p = 0.042 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.068 p = 0.026 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0           p = 0.635 p = 0.628  
     
N               5562  5562  5313  5313   1333  1333 
Adj. R2    0.081  0.101  0.096  0.057   0.143  0.144 
F    55.72  70.14  63.76  41.40   25.70  25.87 
Pr > F    < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  < 0.0001 < 0.0001  
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Table 5 – Regressions of Quarterly Changes in Long-Term Debt Ratios 
 
                     Relative to Control Group (Canadian Firms Listed in Canada) 
Dependent Variable:  All U.S.-Listed Firms  U.S. Firms Listed in U.S.  Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in U.S. 
BLTD    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept        -0.001  -0.001       -0.002  -0.001   -0.001  0.001 
                (-1.02)        (-0.54)  (-1.06)  (-0.51)   (-0.57)  (0.17) 
 
SOX                -0.001  -0.002        -0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.002 
                (-0.33)        (-0.67)  (-0.28)  (-0.67)   (-0.14)  (-0.69) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   0.002  0.001    
    (1.15)  (0.60)    
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  -0.001  -0.001 
    (-0.55)  (-0.25) 
 
U.S. IN U.S.       0.002  0.001 
        (1.26)  (0.62) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.      -0.002  -0.001 
        (-0.65)  (-0.30) 
 
X-LISTED            0.001  0.001 
             (0.34)  (0.12) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED           0.001  0.002 
             (0.19)  (0.34) 
 
∆DIV               0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003***  0.002  0.003 
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               (2.26)  (2.42)  (2.52)  (2.66)   (1.23)  (1.59) 
 
∆INTRATE10T  -1.559*** -1.509*** -1.565*** -1.520***  0.350  -0.620 
    (-7.04)  (-6.78)  (-6.82)  (-6.59)   (1.64)  (-1.35) 
  
GROWTH   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001   -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.43)  (0.54)  (0.33)  (0.48)   (-0.37)  (-0.53) 
 
∆MKTRET   0.050*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052***  0.039*  0.041** 
    (4.99)  (5.16)  (4.90)  (5.10)   (1.89)  (1.98) 
 
EARNMGMT   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.005** 0.005** 
    (4.22)  (4.25)  (4.28)  (4.30)   (2.25)  (2.30) 
 
∆MVASSETS   0.002***   0.003***    0.003***    
    (2.92)    (3.18)     (3.30)   
 
∆REVENUE     0.002**   0.002***    0.010***  
      (2.54)    (1.99)     (7.10) 
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p =0.043 p = 0.042 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.037 p = 0.037 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0           p = 0.893 p = 0.984  
     
N               32042  32042  30719  30719   6567  6567 
Adj. R2    0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003   0.003  0.009 
F    12.24  12.01  11.51  12.19   3.23  7.63 
Pr > F    < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  0.0007  < 0.0001   
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Table 6 – Summary Statistics of Quarterly Changes in Long-Term Debt Ratios Surrounding SOX 
 
 
    t-3  t-2  t-1  t  t+1 
 
Full Sample   -0.000  0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002  0.001 
 (2.42)  (-2.69)  (0.31)  (1.34) 
 
All U.S.-Listed Firms  -0.001  0.006** -0.001*  0.000  0.001 
      (2.56)  (1.85)  (0.29)  (0.09) 
 
U.S.-Based and   -0.002  0.007*** -0.001** 0.001  0.001 
   -Listed Firms     (2.79)  (-2.04)  (0.61)  (0.28) 
 
 
CAN Firms Cross-  0.008  -0.005*  0.009  -0.016** 0.004** 
   Listed in U.S.     (-1.68)  (1.63)  (-2.63)  (2.53) 
 
 
CAN Firms Listed  0.005  0.005  -0.019** -0.018  0.003** 
in CAN     (0.07)  (-2.21)  (0.01)  (2.15)
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Table 7 – Regressions of Quarterly Changes in Short-Term Debt Ratios 
 
                     Relative to Control Group (Canadian Firms Listed in Canada) 
Dependent Variable:  All U.S.-Listed Firms  U.S. Firms Listed in U.S.  Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in U.S. 
BSTD    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept        0.001  0.001       0.001  0.001   -0.001  0.001 
                (0.36)        (0.83)  (0.20)  (0.75)   (-0.21)  (0.19) 
 
SOX                0.003  0.002        0.003  0.002   0.003  0.002 
                (1.24)        (0.92)  (1.29)  (0.91)   (1.03)  (0.75) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   -0.001  -0.002    
    (-0.72)  (-1.21)    
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  -0.001  0.001 
    (-0.17)  (0.13) 
 
U.S. IN U.S.       -0.001  -0.002 
        (-0.59)  (-1.19) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.      -0.001  0.001 
        (-0.24)  (0.12) 
 
X-LISTED            -0.003  -0.004 
             (-0.92)  (-1.05) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED           0.001  0.002 
             (0.22)  (0.31) 
 
∆DIV               -0.001  -.002  -0.001  -0.002   -0.004  -0.003 
               (-1.08)  (-1.35)  (-1.15)  (-1.48)   (-1.63)  (-1.59) 
 
∆INTRATE10T  -1.096*** -0.851*** -1.102*** -0.826***  -1.335*** -0.889* 
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    (-4.84)  (-3.75)  (-4.71)  (-3.52)   (-2.68)  (-1.77) 
  
GROWTH   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001   0.002  0.001 
    (-0.26)  (-0.45)  (-0.13)  (-0.29)   (0.63)  (0.44) 
 
∆MKTRET   -0.019*  -0.018*  -0.021** -0.019*   -0.014  -0.014 
    (-1.86)  (-1.75)  (-1.96)  (-1.84)   (-0.64)  (-0.60) 
 
EARNMGMT   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.007   -0.003  -0.003 
    (-0.17)  (-0.10)  (-0.15)  (-0.07)   (-1.33)  (-1.30) 
 
∆MVASSETS   0.001*    0.002**    0.001    
    (1.66)    (1.99)     (1.16)   
 
∆REVENUE     0.010**   -0.001     0.010***  
      (11.42)    (-0.07)     (6.67) 
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p =0.023 p = 0.022 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.030 p = 0.028 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0           p = 0.436 p = 0.467  
     
N               32042  32042  30719  30719   6567  6567 
Adj. R2    0.001  0.005  0.001  0.005   0.001  0.008 
F    4.06  18.26  4.01  19.06   1.76  6.57 
Pr > F    < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  0.071  < 0.0001 
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Table 8 – Regressions of High- versus Low-Earnings-Management Firms 
 
                High               Low 
     Earnings           Earnings 
     Management        Management 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Intercept        0.071  0.091  -0.086  0.062  0.076  0.035          
                (0.86)  (1.06)  (-0.61)  (0.97)  (1.17)  (0.26) 
 
SOX    -0.032*  -0.033*  -0.17  0.012  0.10  0.007    
    (-1.85)  (-1.88)  (-0.89)  (0.79)  (0.69)  (0.43) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   -0.015      -0.008  
    (-1.11)      (-0.62)   
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  0.003      0.038** 
    (0.14)      (2.42) 
 
U.S. IN U.S.     -0.013      -0.005 
      (-0.94)      (-0.38) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.    0.001      0.038** 
      (0.07)      (2.36) 
X-LISTED       -0.025      -0.068*** 
        (-1.09)      (-2.73) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED      0.006      0.058* 
        (0.16)      (1.86) 
 
DIV               0.009** 0.009** 0.020** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.039*** 
                (2.21)  (2.00)  (1.97)  (4.75)  (4.59)  (4.57) 
  
GROWTH              -0.024*  -0.027** 0.022  -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.037** 
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     (-1.89)  (-2.04)  (1.03)  (-8.25)  (-8.09)  (-2.33) 
 
INTEREST   1.208  0.831  4.167  1.497  1.222  1.664 
     (0.71)  (0.47)  (1.42)  (1.15)  (0.92)  (0.61) 
 
MKTRET         -1.315*** -1.340*** -2.003*** -0.171  -0.141  0.166 
     (-2.93)  (-2.87)  (-2.62)  (-0.53)  (-0.43)  (0.31) 
 
MVASSETS   0.026*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.020***           0.017*** 
    (11.68)  (11.13)  (4.68)  (11.65)  (11.11)  (4.65) 
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p =0.017 p = 0.015 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.750 p < 0.0001 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0          p < 0.0001 p = 0.035  
    
N    2433  2300  633  3129  3013  700 
Adj. R2    0.124  0.118  0.115  0.103  0.098  0.110 
F    44.08  39.47  11.23  45.64  41.99  11.81 
Pr > F    < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
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Chapter Five:  Robustness Tests 
 
 This section contains the results of robustness tests based on business’ and 
households’ perceptions of the U.S. economy.  To control for the outlook of managers on 
the economy, I include the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ (NAPM), now 
known as the Institute of Supply Management (ISM), Index.  Values of the ISM Index 
over 50 are traditionally assumed to indicate economic expansion, while values of at most 
50 are assumed to suggest an economic slowdown.  To control for households’ view of 
the U.S. economy, I use the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI).  
Higher (Lower) values of the CSI suggest that household consumers are more (less) 
confident about the current and future overall economy as well as their own financial 
well-being.  Thus, high (low) values of the CSI imply that household consumers might 
increase (decrease) consumption and personal investment.  Greater investment on the part 
of consumers will increase volume and liquidity in the stock market, possibly increasing 
the attractiveness of new or seasoned equity issues.  Lower levels of investment on the 
part of consumers will make issuing equity less attractive.  This situation will lead to 
higher long-term debt ratios if managers choose to issue long- rather than short-term debt. 
 Table 9 contains the results of robustness tests while controlling for changes in 
purchasing managers’ views of the economy via the ISM Index.  To capture suppliers’ 
views of the economy, I include ∆NAPMISM in all six regression models.  ∆NAPMISM 
equals one if ISM Index increases between two successive quarters and zero otherwise.  
Thus, a value of one for ∆NAPMISM indicates that suppliers’ expectations of economic 
performance increase from one quarter to the next.  A value of zero suggests that the 
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economic outlook of suppliers either does not change or decreases between two 
successive quarters.   
The stand-alone variable SOX indicates that firms in the sample do not change the 
rate of increase in their long-term debt ratios after SOX.  Also, the three interaction terms 
– SOX*U.S.-LISTED, SOX*U.S. IN U.S., and SOX*X-LISTED – indicate that, in the 
SOX era, listing location is robust to changes in suppliers’ economic expectations in that 
the changes in expectations do not affect the rate of change in long-term leverage after 
SOX. 
 Table 10 contains the results of robustness tests based on the direction of change 
in household consumers’ views of the economy.  To capture consumer sentiment, I 
include ∆UMICHCSI in regression models.  ∆UMICHCSI equals one if the CSI Index 
moves upward between two successive quarters and zero otherwise.  If consumer 
sentiment improves, consumers may expect their income to grow, enabling them to 
increase their investment in – and demand for – stocks and bonds.  As in Table 9, Table 
10 shows that firms in the sample do not change the rate of increase in their long-term 
debt ratios after SOX (i.e., the stand-alone variable SOX is not significant).  Also, the 
three interaction terms – SOX*U.S.-LISTED, SOX*U.S. IN U.S., and SOX*X-LISTED 
– indicate that, in the SOX era, changes in consumer sentiment do not affect the rate of 
change in firms’ long-term debt ratios.
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Table 9 – Robustness Test Based on Quarterly Changes in Manufacturing Activity 
 
This table contains the results of robustness tests based on manufacturing output, based on the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ 
(NAPM) Index (now known as the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) Index).  A value of the ISM Index over 50 suggests economic 
expansion, as managers of manufacturing firms increase production of goods.  The dependent variable is the change in the book long-term debt 
ratio (BLTD) for U.S. and Canadian firms in Compustat from 2000 to 2004.  The book long-term debt ratio is defined as the ratio of the book 
values of long-term debt to total assets.  The book value of debt is used to proxy for the market value of debt.  The market value of assets equals 
the market value of debt plus the market value of equity, defined as the product of the quarter-end number of outstanding common shares and the 
quarter-end stock price.  SOX is a dummy variable that equals one on or after July 30, 2002, and zero otherwise.  U.S.-LISTED is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange, regardless of whether the firm is based in the U.S. or Canada, and zero otherwise.  
U.S. IN U.S. is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is based in the U.S. and listed in the U.S.;  otherwise, U.S. IN U.S. equals zero.  X-
LISTED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is based in Canada and cross-listed in the U.S. and zero otherwise.  ∆DIV is the natural log 
of the difference in contemporaneous and lagged total dividends.  ∆INTRATE10T is the annual change in the 10-year Treasury rate.  GROWTH is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a growth firm, defined as having Tobin’s q > 1, and zero otherwise.  Tobin’s q is the market-to-book 
ratio of total assets.  ∆MKTRET is the natural log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value-weighted market return found in CRSP.  
∆MVASSETS is the natural log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value of the market value of assets.  ∆REVENUE is the natural 
log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value of the market value of assets.  EARNMGMT measures a firm’s pre-SOX earnings 
management, defined as the residuals from the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) model.  ∆NAPMISM is the change in the ISM Index value.  *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1% levels, respectively.  T-values are in parentheses.   
 
                     Relative to Control Group (Canadian Firms Listed in Canada) 
Dependent Variable:  All U.S.-Listed Firms  U.S. Firms Listed in U.S.  Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in U.S. 
BLTD    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept        -0.002  -0.001       -0.002  -0.001   -0.001  0.001 
                (-1.03)        (-0.54)  (-1.07)  (-0.52)   (-0.52)  (0.20) 
 
SOX                -0.001  -0.002        -0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.002 
                (-0.33)        (-0.67)  (-0.28)  (-0.66)   (-0.15)  (-0.69) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   0.002  0.001    
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    (1.16)  (0.60)    
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  -0.001  -0.001 
    (-0.56)  (-0.25) 
 
U.S. IN U.S.       0.002  0.001 
        (1.29)  (0.64) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.      -0.002  -0.001 
        (-0.67)  (-0.31) 
 
X-LISTED            0.001  0.001 
             (0.27)  (0.04) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED           0.001  0.002 
             (0.24)  (0.40) 
 
∆NAPMISM   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001   -0.001*** -0.001***  
    (0.23)  (0.10)  (0.65)  (0.49)   (-3.00)  (-3.28) 
 
SOX* ∆NAPMISM              
                
 
∆DIV               0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003***  0.003  0.003 
               (2.25)  (2.42)  (2.51)  (2.66)   (1.24)  (1.60) 
 
∆INTRATE10T  -1.563*** -1.511*** -1.577*** -1.529***  -0.930** -0.554 
    (-7.03)  (-6.77)  (-6.85)  (-6.61)   (-2.03)  (-1.20) 
  
GROWTH   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001   -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.42)  (0.54)  (0.31)  (0.47)   (-0.29)  (-0.46) 
 
∆MKTRET   0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.053***  0.035*  0.036* 
    (4.99)  (5.15)  (4.93)  (5.12)   (1.67)  (1.74) 
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EARNMGMT   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.005** 0.005** 
    (4.22)  (4.25)  (4.28)  (4.30)   (2.24)  (2.29) 
 
∆MVASSETS   0.002***   0.003***    0.003***    
    (2.93)    (3.21)     (3.19)   
 
∆REVENUE     0.002**   0.002**    0.010***  
      (2.54)    (1.99)     (7.17) 
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p =0.042 p = 0.042 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.034 p = 0.035 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0           p = 0.851 p = 0.935  
     
N               32042  32042  30719  30719   6567  6567 
Adj. R2    0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003   0.004  0.011 
F    11.02  10.81  11.01  10.38   3.81  7.95 
Pr > F < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  < 0.0001 < 0.0001  
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Table 10 – Robustness Test Based on Changes in Consumer Sentiment 
 
This table contains the results of robustness tests based on consumers’ beliefs about the economy as reflected in the direction of change in the 
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (UMICHCSI).  The dependent variable is the change in the book long-term debt ratio 
(BLTD) for U.S. and Canadian firms in Compustat from 2000 to 2004.  The book long-term debt ratio is defined as the ratio of the book values of 
long-term debt to total assets.  The book value of debt is used to proxy for the market value of debt.  The market value of assets equals the market 
value of debt plus the market value of equity, defined as the product of the quarter-end number of outstanding common shares and the quarter-end 
stock price.  SOX is a dummy variable that equals one on or after July 30, 2002, and zero otherwise.  U.S.-LISTED is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange, regardless of whether the firm is based in the U.S. or Canada, and zero otherwise.  U.S. IN U.S. is 
a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is based in the U.S. and listed in the U.S.;  otherwise, U.S. IN U.S. equals zero.  X-LISTED is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is based in Canada and cross-listed in the U.S. and zero otherwise.  ∆DIV is the natural log of the difference in 
contemporaneous and lagged total dividends.  ∆INTRATE10T is the annual change in the 10-year Treasury rate.  GROWTH is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm is a growth firm, defined as having Tobin’s q > 1, and zero otherwise.  Tobin’s q is the market-to-book ratio of total 
assets.  ∆MKTRET is the natural log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value-weighted market return found in CRSP.  
∆MVASSETS is the natural log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value of the market value of assets.  ∆REVENUE is the natural 
log of the change in the contemporaneous and lagged value of the market value of assets.  EARNMGMT measures a firm’s pre-SOX earnings 
management, defined as the residuals from the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) model.  ∆UMICHCSI is the direction of change in the 
UMICHSCI value.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1% levels, respectively.  T-values are in parentheses. 
 
                     Relative to Control Group (Canadian Firms Listed in Canada) 
Dependent Variable:  All U.S.-Listed Firms  U.S. Firms Listed in U.S.  Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in U.S. 
BLTD    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept        -0.001  -0.001       -0.001  -0.001   -0.001  0.001 
                (-0.63)        (-0.15)  (-0.64)  (-0.10)   (-0.11)  (0.50) 
 
SOX                -0.001  -0.002        -0.001  -0.002   -0.001  -0.002 
                (-0.47)        (-0.81)  (-0.43)  (-0.82)   (-0.35)  (-0.86) 
 
U.S.-LISTED   0.002  0.001    
    (1.13)  (0.58)    
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED  -0.001  -0.001 
    (-0.54)  (-0.24) 
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U.S. IN U.S.       0.002  0.001 
        (1.24)  (0.60) 
 
SOX*U.S. IN U.S.      -0.002  -0.001 
        (-0.63)  (-0.29) 
 
X-LISTED            0.001  0.001 
             (0.34)  (0.11) 
 
SOX*X-LISTED           0.001  0.002 
             (0.19)  (0.34) 
 
∆UMICHCSI   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002   -0.002  -0.002 
    (-1.01)  (-1.07)  (-1.04)  (-1.13)   (-0.74)  (-0.69)  
 
∆DIV               0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003***  0.002  0.003 
               (2.27)  (2.43)  (2.53)  (2.67)   (1.24)  (1.61) 
 
∆INTRATE10T  -1.554*** -1.504*** -1.561*** -1.515***  -0.984** -0.621 
    (-7.02)  (-6.76)  (-6.80)  (-6.56)   (-2.14)  (-1.35) 
  
GROWTH   0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001   -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.45)  (0.57)  (0.36)  (0.51)   (-0.35)  (-0.52) 
 
∆MKTRET   0.042*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.044***  0.029  0.031 
    (3.45)  (3.55)  (3.36)  (3.46)   (1.14)  (1.24) 
 
EARNMGMT   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.005** 0.005** 
    (4.22)  (4.25)  (4.28)  (4.30)   (2.24)  (2.30) 
 
∆MVASSETS   0.002***   0.003***    0.003***    
    (2.91)    (3.16)     (3.32)   
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∆REVENUE     0.002**   0.002***    0.010***  
      (2.55)    (2.00)     (7.10) 
 
H0:  b1 + b3 = 0  p =0.026 p = 0.025 
H0:  b1 + b5 = 0      p = 0.022 p = 0.021 
H0:  b1 + b7 = 0           p = 0.983 p = 0.933  
     
N               32042  32042  30719  30719   6567  6567 
Adj. R2    0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003   0.003  0.009 
F    11.12  10.92  11.08  10.48   2.96  6.91 
Pr > F    < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001  0.001  < 0.0001 
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Figure 1 – NAPM/ISM Index 
 
Quarterly values of the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ Index, now known as the 
Institute for Supply Management Index, from 2000 to 2004 are shown below.   
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Figure 2 – University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
Quarterly values of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) from 2000 to 
2004 are shown below. 
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on capital 
structure.  This analysis focuses on the long-term debt ratio, defined as book value of 
long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets.  Since SOX applies only to firms 
listed in the U.S. regardless of where the firms are headquartered, the control group for 
this study consists of Canadian firms listed in Canada.  The test groups are (1) U.S.-based 
firms listed in the U.S., (2) Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S., and (3) all U.S.-listed 
firms, whether based in the U.S. or Canada.   
Relative to Canadian firms listed in Canada (i.e., the control group, since those 
firms are not subject to SOX), SOX is associated with higher book long-term debt ratios 
for all U.S.-listed firms in general.  This result is consistent with the view that SOX 
requires managers to release negative news, leading to lower stock prices and greater 
reluctance to issue equity.  U.S. firms listed in the U.S. drive this result, as Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. do not alter their debt ratios.  Also, relative to the control 
firms, SOX is associated with smaller quarterly changes in book long-term debt ratios.  
Again, U.S. firms listed on a U.S. exchange drive this result.  In addition, firms that 
heavily (modestly) manage pre-SOX earnings decrease (increase) their long-term 
leverage ratios after SOX.  These results are robust to suppliers’ and consumers’ 
expectations about the economy. 
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Chapter Seven:  Introduction (Credit Ratings) 
 
Diamond (1989) argues that a firm can establish a reputation over time as a sound 
borrower by repaying debt in a timely manner.  That reputation is conveyed by rating agencies, 
which use both public and private information to form opinions about borrowers’ payment history 
and their expected ability to repay debt (Goh and Ederington, 1993).  Therefore, if a firm’s 
operating or information environment changes, that change can impact the firm’s credit rating.  
An increase (decrease) in a firm’s credit rating affects that firm’s ability to borrow by lowering 
(raising) its cost of debt.  If a firm’s cost of debt is too high, that firm might pass up positive net-
present-value opportunities.  Since the value of a firm equals the sum of assets in place and the 
present value of growth opportunities (Myers and Majluf, 1984), a firm’s ability to borrow 
impacts its value.  It also follows that credit rating agencies provide valuable information to 
potential lenders to assist them in their decisions to lend to corporate borrowers. 
Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) find that the information content of announcements of credit 
rating changes increases after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).  Prior to Reg FD, firms 
routinely disclosed information to selected parties (typically, equity analysts), which profited 
from that information.  To address the issue of selective disclosure and level the playing field 
among market participants, the U.S. Congress passed Reg FD in August, 2000, and enacted it on 
October 23, 2000.  Reg FD attempts to reduce selective disclosure by (1) allowing credit rating 
agencies to continue to access information that other market participants learn only when the 
rating agencies issue credit ratings and (2) prohibiting equity analysts from receiving that 
information firsthand.  By mandating that only credit rating agencies receive certain information 
directly, managers cannot choose to reveal (i.e., selectively disclose) that information to equity 
analysts or other market participants.  As a result of Reg FD, rating agencies have relatively early 
access to information that other market participants, including equity analysts, can no longer 
access firsthand. 
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Even after Reg FD, several accounting and financial scandals occurred in the U.S. 
markets.  Many executives misled investors and credit rating agencies about their firms’ 
operations and financials, leading to erroneously high ratings and, ultimately, the collapse of 
several firms.  To address those issues in the U.S. financial markets, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX” or “the Act”) on July 30, 2002.  SOX requires all firms listed on a 
U.S. exchange to take steps to accurately report accounting and financial information.   
In this paper, I examine changes in credit ratings after SOX.  I analyze the odds and the 
magnitude of changes in short- versus long-term credit ratings as well as rating upgrades versus 
downgrades.  If SOX enhances the information environment, rating agencies should adjust credit 
ratings accordingly.  Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman (2008) conclude that SOX requires managers 
to report information that they would prefer to retain.  Although rating agencies are informed 
market participants relative to atomistic investors, they are external monitors.  Thus, one 
possibility is that credit rating agencies are subject to some degree of information asymmetry and 
will learn bad news about some firms.  This situation will lead rating agencies to downgrade the 
credit ratings of those firms. 
A second possibility is that credit ratings increase after SOX.  Povel, Singh, and Winton 
(2007) argue that SOX might not be associated with improved accuracy in financial statements.  
One implication of Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007) is that the quality of financial statements 
may become lower than before SOX due to greater earnings management after SOX.  In this case, 
rating agencies’ perceptions of firms may erroneously increase, leading to higher credit ratings.   
A third possibility is that credit ratings do not change after SOX.  The reason is that a 
second implication of Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007) is that the quality of financial reports may 
not worsen but may remain the same after SOX.  Clearly, ratings will not change in this case.  
Another reason credit ratings may not change after SOX is that any news, whether positive or 
negative, about firms may not surprise credit rating agencies since the agencies (1) are active 
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monitors, suggesting that they are somewhat informed market participants, and (2) are privy to 
information that equity analysts cannot access firsthand due to Reg FD.  
The revelation of pre-SOX earnings management is a possible source of bad news after 
SOX because, once the fraudulent reporting is revealed, investors will realize that their views of 
firms’ intrinsic earnings, cash flows, and, consequently, firm value, have been distorted.  Thus, I 
hypothesize that pre-SOX earnings management is directly related to the magnitude and odds of a 
rating downgrade after SOX.  The reason is as follows.  Patterson and Smith (2007) find that 
auditing and control improve after SOX, and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) find that firms use 
more conservative accounting techniques after SOX.  Accordingly, Chang, Fernando, and Liao 
(2009) find that the market believes that earnings quality improves after SOX.  Although the use 
of more conservative accounting techniques will lead to more accurate financial statements, the 
financial results will be worse than the market expects.  This outcome is consistent with Akhigbe, 
Martin, and Newman (2008).  In response to the bad news, credit rating agencies will lower those 
firms’ credit ratings because the rating agencies will realize that those firms’ outlook is not as 
bright as once believed.3  Thus, to prevent lower credit ratings, firms may engage in more 
sophisticated earnings-management techniques after SOX. 
The primary finding in this paper is that, in the SOX era, aggressive earnings 
management is associated with short- and long-term credit rating downgrades.  Ordinal regression 
results show that, after SOX, the probability that the short-term credit rating of a firm that 
aggressively manages earnings is downgraded is approximately 1.5% higher.  For long-term 
rating downgrades, the increase in probability is approximately 1.4%.  These results are robust to 
firm size and economic outlook, as measured by the Institute of Supply Management (formerly 
known as the National Association of Purchasing Managers) Index.  Although (1) SOX is shown 
                                                 
3 Another reason for the possible downgrading of a firm’s credit rating due to earnings management is as 
follows.  Although Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) do not specifically address SOX, they find that banks 
tighten loan terms to firms that restate earnings because of prior fraudulent reporting.  Since credit rating 
agencies are active monitors just like banks, they may follow suit and punish firms that manage earnings by 
lowering their credit rating. 
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to be associated with higher long-term leverage use and (2) higher leverage is generally 
associated with a lower credit rating, the results of this study, that SOX is associated with both 
lower short- and long-term credit ratings, cannot be inferred from the facts above.  SOX may 
affect short-term credit ratings moreso than long-term ratings because SOX is intended to quickly 
restore and sustain investor confidence in U.S. markets.  Clearly, SOX will immediately impact 
the short term.  However, if rating agencies believe that the fraud that led to SOX will not impact 
the long-term solvency of firms, long-term credit ratings may not change. 
Given that credit ratings reflect the creditworthiness of an entire firm and that a change in 
that firm’s credit ratings should affect its bond ratings, this study contributes to the literature on 
bond rating changes.  Prior research shows that bond rating changes provide relevant information, 
as evidenced by cumulative abnormal returns (e.g., Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982;  Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1986;  Goh and Ederington, 1993).  My analysis examines the impact of the 
enactment of SOX on the direction and magnitude of changes in credit ratings.   
This paper joins a growing list of papers that study the impact of legislative changes on 
firm operations, where such changes represent unique structural breaks in different aspects of 
firm behavior (e.g., Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos, 2002).  In using an exogenous change in 
firms’ information environment associated with SOX, this approach mitigates the endogenous 
relationship between a firm’s credit ratings and its information environment.  This paper also 
adds to the existing literature by examining how changes in the information environment affect 
firms’ credit ratings, which ultimately influence the cost of capital.   
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature on SOX by documenting the Act’s 
effect on credit rating changes.  My results suggests that, since SOX is associated with lower 
credit ratings, SOX has achieved one of its goals – namely, to spur managers to reveal 
information that accurately shows the way they manage their firms’ operations, even though that 
information might be negative.  Regarding the benefits of SOX, Jain and Rezaee (2006), Li, 
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Pincus, and Rego (2008), and Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) document 
positive announcement returns associated with SOX.4 
The paper closest to this paper is Cheng and Neamtiu (2009).  Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) 
examine whether credit rating agencies, which face stiffer government regulation and consumer 
criticism in the post-SOX era, improve the timeliness, accuracy, and volatility of credit ratings 
after SOX.  They find that, in the post-SOX era of greater regulation and expectations of higher 
standards from investors, rating agencies (1) release rating information sooner, suggesting 
improved timeliness of ratings, (2) correctly rate firms more often, suggesting improved 
accuracy, and (3) lower the standard deviations of rating levels, implying lower volatility of 
ratings.  These findings contradict rating agencies’ assertion that a tradeoff exists between the 
accuracy and timeliness of ratings (Cantor and Mann, 2003).  Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) base 
their study on academic (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Loffler, 2004; Beaver, Shakespeare, and 
Soliman, 2006) and industry (Cantor and Mann, 2003) literature that identifies the timeliness, 
accuracy, and volatility of credit ratings as most important to users of those ratings.  
The primary difference between this paper and Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) is that this 
paper examines the interplay between an important aspect of firm behavior – earnings 
management – and legislative change on firms’ credit ratings.  Earnings management generates 
smoother earnings and cash flows, leading to higher perceived firm value.  Since a firm’s ability 
to repay its debts stems directly from the cash that creditors expect that firm to generate, and 
since credit ratings are directly related to expected cash flows, high (low) earnings management 
prior to SOX can greatly (modestly) impact credit ratings after SOX. 
                                                 
4 Other benefits associated with SOX include lower pay for CEOs of firms that do not comply with SOX’s 
director-independence provisions prior to SOX (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009) and less insider trading 
(Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2007;  Brochet, 2010).  At the same time, some costs associated with SOX 
include noisier stock prices (Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott, 2010), a lower supply of, a greater demand for, 
and higher pay for directors (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009), greater opacity (Garleanu and Zwiebel, 
2009), stagnant market values (Harris and Raviv, 2008), lower market values (Zhang, 2007;  Wintoki, 
2007;  Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003;  Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007;  Iliev, 2009), and profitable 
insider trading by the audit committee (Ravina and Sapienza, 2009). 
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This paper also differs from Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) in that it documents the actual 
direction of change in credit ratings after SOX.  With respect to the accuracy of ratings, Cheng 
and Neamtiu (2009) find fewer Type I and Type II errors after SOX.  They define a Type I error 
as failing to downgrade the rating of a firm that eventually defaults and a Type II error as 
downgrading the rating of a firm that does not default.  Although Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) 
document greater accuracy and improved timeliness of credit ratings, their results do not imply 
that credit ratings will be lower post-SOX compared to pre-SOX.  Their findings suggest that 
credit agencies rate firms more accurately and publish rating changes in a more timely manner 
after SOX, whether ratings are adjusted upward or downward.  My analysis documents (1) the 
odds of a rating increase, decrease, or non-change after SOX and (2) the factors that affect credit 
ratings after SOX.   
 The remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section II describes the data and approach 
used in this analysis.  Section III discusses the results.  Section IV contains robustness tests.  
Section V concludes. 
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Chapter Eight:  Data and Approach 
 Data for this study consist of all firms in CRSP and Compustat from 2000 to 2004 that 
are (1) based in either the U.S. or Canada and (2) listed in either the U.S. or Canada, including 
cross-listing from Canada onto a U.S. exchange.  Additional criteria for inclusion in the sample 
are (1) active, (2) not an American Depository Receipt or foreign government, (3) positive and 
non-missing book value of assets, book value of debt, and revenue, (4) non-negative quarterly 
closing prices, and (5) non-missing values of the S&P Short- and Long-Term Issuer Credit 
Ratings found in Compustat.  Consistent with traditional finance literature, utilities (SIC codes 
4000-4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded.  Also, I control for new-
listing bias by excluding firms that (1) do not have data in Compustat for the first quarter of 2000 
but (2) appear in Compustat at another point between 2000 and 2004.  In addition, I control for 
survivorship bias by including only those firms with entries in Compustat across the sample 
period. 
The null and alternative hypotheses for credit-rating changes after SOX are below.   
H0:  SOX does not affect firms’ credit ratings.   
SOX may not materially affect the information environment for credit rating agencies.  
This situation may occur because credit rating agencies may not suffer from a large information 
asymmetry prior to SOX.   
H1:  SOX affects firms’ credit ratings. 
This situation is likely to occur because SOX is related to the release of negative 
information about firms (Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman, 2008).  Although credit rating agencies 
are informed market participants to a large degree, they still suffer from some degree of 
information asymmetry since they are separate from the firms that they follow.  Thus, rating 
agencies may be surprised by negative news and lower firms’ credit ratings.  The reason is that, if 
news emerges that some firms managed earnings prior to SOX, rating agencies may believe that 
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the earnings of those firms were inflated and that the actual earnings level is lower than reported.  
As a result, rating agencies will have less confidence in those firms’ ability to repay their debts on 
time and in full, particularly in the short term.  Rating agencies’ lower confidence in the ability of 
firms to honor their debts will lead to lower short-term credit ratings for those firms.  
The expected behavior of long-term credit ratings is less clear at the outset.  On one hand, 
long-term ratings will fall if rating agencies believe that the negative information revealed after 
SOX impacts firms’ ability to repay debts over the long term.  On the other hand, long-term credit 
ratings will not change (will increase) if rating agencies believe that firms’ ability to repay debt 
will not change (will strengthen) in the long term, defined as one year after SOX. 
To determine whether the likelihood of a credit rating change is persistently different 
after SOX, I use the binary logistic model below.     
CreditRatingi,t = fi,t-1(SOX, INTCOV, IGRADE, BORDERLINE, D/A, EM, MKTRET, SOX*EM)          (1) 
The dependent variable equals one if firm i’s credit rating is downgraded from time t-1 to 
time t and zero otherwise.  In this paper, quarterly intervals are used.  SOX equals one on or after 
July 30, 2002, and zero otherwise.  If SOX is associated with the increased revelation of negative 
news (Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman 2008), the chance of a downgrade should increase.  Short- 
(Long-) term credit ratings are the S&P Short- (Long-) Term Issuer Credit Ratings found in 
Compustat.  Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings range from AAA (highest) to SD (Selective 
Default), the lowest ranking.  Short-Term Issuer Credit Ratings range from A-1+ (highest) to D 
(lowest).  The short- and long-term ratings appear on a quarterly basis. 
To assess the impact of earnings management in the SOX era on credit ratings, I use an 
interaction term, SOX*EM.  As such, this variable is the primary variable of interest in this 
analysis.  SOX*EM equals one if a firm’s magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of earnings 
management exceeds the median magnitude and zero otherwise.  I use the absolute value of 
earnings management in accordance with Klein (2002), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and 
Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008). 
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Since Goh and Ederington (1993) document that credit ratings reflect a firm’s expected 
ability to repay any debt borrowed in the future, I include a firm’s interest coverage ratio 
(INTCOV), defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expense.  
Values of INTCOV that exceed one imply that (1) repaying interest does not exhaust EBIT and 
(2) such excess EBIT from a prior period may be combined with contemporaneous EBIT to cover 
contemporaneous interest.  Thus, values of INTCOV greater than one may contain information 
about a firm’s ability to meet future debt obligations and, if so, should be associated with a lower 
chance of a rating downgrade. 
In accordance with Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), I control for whether a firm’s debt is 
rated as investment grade (IGRADE).  IGRADE equals one if either a firm’s short- or long-term 
credit rating is investment grade and zero otherwise.  Investment-grade firms are considered safer 
relative to speculative-grade firms and may be less likely to be downgraded.  Thus, I expect 
IGRADE to be associated with a lower likelihood of a rating decrease.  A short-term credit rating 
of A-1+, A-1, A-2, or A-3 is considered investment-grade, while long-term credit ratings from 
AAA to A- are classified as investment-grade.5   
I also control for whether a firm’s credit rating is borderline.  This situation needs to be 
controlled for because firms with ratings on the border of a rating range may be more likely to 
experience a rating change compared to firms whose credit ratings are solidly within a rating 
range.  For example, firms with a borderline long-term credit rating (e.g., A-) are just meeting the 
requirements of the broad “A” category, so even a minor mishap in performance may result in a 
rating downgrade to the next broad category (the “B” range, in this case).  BORDERLINE equals 
one if a firm’s credit rating ends with a plus or a minus, signifying that the rating is on either the 
upper or lower end of a rating range.  Otherwise, BORDERLINE equals zero.  For short-term 
                                                 
5 Since Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) examine CARs to shareholders associated with Reg FD and firm 
characteristics, they set IGRADE equal to one if a firm’s credit rating is either downgraded from 
investment grade to speculative grade or upgraded from speculative grade to investment grade.  Otherwise, 
they set IGRADE equal to zero. 
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ratings, the values A-3, B, B-3, and C are considered borderline ratings.  AA+, AA-, A+, A-, 
BBB+, BBB-, BB+, BB-, B+, B-, CCC+, and CCC- constitute borderline ratings.   
D/A is a firm’s debt-to-assets ratio in book-value terms.  On one hand, debt may reduce a 
firm’s value by decreasing its ability to take on projects with a positive net present value, a 
situation to which Myers (1977) refers as the debt-overhang problem.  Thus, debt overhang will 
lead to weaker expected profits and will lower the firm’s ability to repay future debt, suggesting a 
lower credit rating.  On the other hand, since firms might take on debt to signal their quality (Ross 
1977), high leverage might reduce the odds of a downgrade because high-leverage firms might 
reveal their higher quality through the private information provided to credit rating agencies.   
EM represents earnings management.  If SOX leads to increased revelations of negative 
information (Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman, 2008), I expect the magnitude of change in a firm’s 
credit rating after SOX to be directly related to earnings management before SOX.  To control for 
earnings management, I identify firms that SOX is most likely to affect based on earnings 
management prior to passage of the Act.  One measure of earnings management used in this 
analysis is discretionary accruals, which include items that managers have latitude in marking up 
or down.  Discretionary accruals can affect several accounts, including such uncollected items as 
accounts receivable or the allowance for doubtful accounts as well as such unpaid items as 
salaries and interest.   
To measure earnings management, I use the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (KLW, 2005) 
model, in which total accruals are regressed on the reciprocal of lagged total assets, the change in 
sales, the level of PPE, and either the contemporaneous or lagged level of return on assets (ROA), 
where ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets.6  The KLW (2005) model is below. 
TAi,t/Ai,t-1 = β0i 1/Ai,t-1 + β1i ∆REVi,t/Ait-1 + β2i PPEi,t/Ai,t-1 + β3i NIi,t/Ai,t-1 + εi,t   (2) 
                                                 
6 For other earnings management models, see Jones (1991), Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996), Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998), and Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006, 2008). 
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In the KLW (2005) model, total accruals are defined as the change in non-cash 
working capital before income taxes payable minus total depreciation expense.  Ai,t-1 is 
the book value of total assets for firm i at time t-1.  ∆REVi,t is the change in revenue for 
firm i from period t-1 to t.  PPEi,t is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i at time 
t.  NIi,t-1 is lagged net income (i.e., at time t-1) for firm i. 
If SOX prompts managers to reduce discretionary accruals in an effort to promote 
accurate earnings, lower credit ratings may result.  This case is possible because reducing 
accruals will increase the amount charged against revenue, leading to lower net operating profit 
after taxes (NOPAT) and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).  Lower NOPAT and EBIT 
imply that a firm is less able to meet financial obligations.  Rating agencies will notice this 
situation and will downgrade the firm’s credit rating.     
MKTRET, which controls for market conditions surrounding SOX, is the value-weighted 
return on the market surrounding SOX.  Kahneman and Tversky (1973) provide a basis for 
including this variable, as they find that market participants tend to base decisions too much on 
immediate news and too little on underlying trends.  Building on Kahneman and Tversky (1973), 
DeBondt and Thaler (1990) find that, while overreaction is conventionally attributed to atomistic 
investors, security analysts (sometimes referred to as “smart money” since they are traditionally 
more informed that atomistic investors) also overreact.  They measure overreaction based on the 
extremity of analysts’ forecasts, given the information available at the time of the forecast.  Also, 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that analysts underreact to bad news but overreact to good news, 
suggesting optimism on the part of security analysts.  Since credit rating analysts can also be 
considered smart money, the market’s performance surrounding SOX could affect the decision 
and/or magnitude of a rating change.  If market returns are strong, analysts may be optimistic 
about firms’ performance in the short term, leading to less drastic changes in credit ratings.   
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To explain the level of credit ratings after SOX, I use two variations of Model (1).  For 
the first variation, I treat Model (1) as an ordered logit model.  In the ordered logit model, the 
dependent variable, CreditRatingi,t, is sorted in descending order.  As a result, the ordered logit 
model explains achieving higher cardinal values of CreditRatingi,t, which correspond to lower 
credit ratings.  A mapping of short- and long-term credit ratings to ordinal values is contained in 
Table 1.  For the second variation, I treat Model (1) as an ordered logistic model in explaining the 
level of credit ratings. 
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Chapter Nine:  Results and Robustness Tests 
Table 2 contains summary statistics of the quantitative independent variables used in this 
analysis.  Panels A and B contain pre- and post-SOX measures, respectively.  Table 2 also shows 
that, based on tests of differences, the mean, median, and standard deviation of EM post-SOX 
differ from the respective pre-SOX values at the 1% level.  The mean level of EM increases from 
$2,000 (0.002) before SOX to -$183,000 after SOX.  At the same time, the standard deviation of 
EM increases from $250,000 (0.25) before SOX to $460,000 (0.46) after SOX.   These results 
suggest that the magnitude of earnings management increases after SOX. 
Table 3 shows the number of short- and long-term rating changes annually.  Panel A 
shows that, from 2000 to 2004, the number of short-term rating downgrades increases while the 
number of short-term rating upgrades decreases.  This result is consistent with the notions that (1) 
SOX, which became law in 2002, could be associated with the release of bad news about firms 
(Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman 2008) and (2) rating agencies expect the bad news to impact 
firms’ creditworthiness in the short term.  Panel B shows that downgrades and upgrades decrease 
from 2000 to 2004.  At the same time, the number of non-changes increases over that time frame.   
 In the remainder of this section, I discuss regression results.  Tables 4 through 9 show the 
results of regressions that seek to explain (1) the odds of a short- or long-term credit rating 
downgrade after SOX or (2) the levels of short- or long-term credit ratings.  For each term other 
than the intercept in the models shown in Tables 4 and 5, three numbers are presented in the 
following order:  (1) the logistic regression coefficient, (2) the probability, based on the χ2 test, of 
obtaining a regression coefficient larger than the one shown, and (3) the odds ratio, or the factor 
by which the odds of a rating downgrade are affected by a unit increase in the given explanatory 
variable.  For the intercept, only the first two numbers are shown.  To interpret the marginal 
effects associated with interaction terms in logit models, I use the method shown in Ai and 
Norton (2003).  They demonstrate that cross-partial derivatives are needed to accurately interpret 
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the marginal effects of interactions in logit models.  Since the models used in this paper do not 
contain any higher-order terms, the cross-partial derivatives result in the coefficient of the 
interaction term. 
The main result of Table 4 is that, in the SOX era, earnings management affects the odds 
of a credit rating downgrade.  The interaction term, SOX*EM, captures the difference in the odds 
of a rating downgrade for high- vs. low-earnings-management firms after SOX.  Model (1) shows 
that, after SOX, high-earnings-management firms’ odds of a short-term rating decrease are 1.278 
times higher than before SOX.  The increase in odds of a rating downgrade is equivalent to a 
1.3% (i.e., e0.245) greater chance of a downgrade.  Similarly, Model (4) shows that, after SOX, 
firms that aggressively manage earnings have higher odds of a long-term rating decrease by a 
factor of 1.788, equal to a 1.8% (i.e., e0.581) greater chance of a downgrade. 
 The variable SOX captures changes over time after SOX that affect all firms in the 
sample.  In Table 4, Models (1) through (3) indicate that SOX is associated with greater odds of a 
short-term rating downgrade for all firms.  For example, the odds ratio of 1.141 for Model (1) 
shows that the odds of a short-term credit rating decrease are 1.141 times greater in the SOX era 
compared to pre-SOX.  This result translates to a 1.1% increase (i.e., e0.132) in the probability of a 
lower short-term credit rating after SOX.  This result is consistent with the view that SOX 
requires managers to reveal negative information about their firms (Akhigbe, Martin, and 
Newman 2008) and that the news surprises credit rating agencies, which are relatively well-
informed market participants.   
However, Models (4) through (6) in Table 4 show that SOX is associated with lower odds 
of a long-term rating downgrade.  For example, the odds ratio of 0.162 in Model (4) indicates that 
the odds of a long-term rating downgrade fall by a factor of 0.652, or a 0.2% (i.e., e-1.819) lower 
probability of a long-term rating downgrade after SOX.  This result is consistent with SOX’s 
association with financial reports that are both actually (Patterson and Smith, 2007;  Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys, 2008) and perceived by market participants (Chang, Fernando, and Liao, 2009) to be 
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more credible.  The result is also consistent with the hypothesis that firms’ credit ratings may 
suffer in the short term due to negative news but that the news is not expected to adversely impact 
firms in the long run. 
 Table 4 also shows that the interest coverage ratio (INTCOV) impacts the odds of a 
short-term rating downgrade after SOX.  The coefficient on INTCOV is negative, implying that, 
for a one-percentage-point increase in the interest coverage ratio, the odds of a short-term credit 
rating downgrade decrease.  Model (2) shows that a one percentage-point increase in a firm’s 
interest coverage ratio lowers the odds of a rating downgrade by a factor of 0.993, which is 
equivalent to a 1% (i.e., e-0.008) reduction in the probability of a lower credit rating.  This result 
suggests that, in the short term, a firm’s ability to meet its interest payments lowers the odds that 
its credit rating will be lowered.  
Table 4 shows that the existence of a firm’s debt on the upper border of a rating range 
(UPPERBORDER) is associated with lower odds of a downgrade.  This result is logical because, 
if a firm’s credit rating is just below the next higher rating category, investors expect that firm to 
be close to meeting the criteria to be included in the higher category.  Table 4 also shows that, if a 
firm’s credit rating is on the lower border of a rating range (LOWERBORDER), the odds that the 
firm’s credit rating is downgraded increases.  This result can be explained in two ways.  One 
explanation is based on statistics from my sample of firms.  In my sample, firms with borderline 
short-term ratings manage earnings more firms with borderline long-term ratings.  The magnitude 
of earnings management for firms with a borderline short- (long-) term credit rating is $207,980 
($154,152).  Another explanation is that credit rating agencies are slow to downgrade ratings 
since regulatory arbitrage allows holders of riskier bonds to earn higher returns (Cornaggia and 
Cornaggia, 2011).  Regarding the debt ratio, D/A, higher leverage ratios are associated with lower 
odds and probabilities of a rating downgrade.  This result is consistent with Ross (1977). 
 Table 4 also shows that earnings management (EM) affects the odds of a downgrade of 
both short- and long-term credit ratings.  For example, Model (1) shows that EM increases the 
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odds of a short-term credit rating downgrade by a factor of 3.392.  This result is equivalent to a 
higher probability of a downgrade of 3.4%.  Similarly, Model (4) shows that EM increases the 
odds of a long-term rating downgrade by a factor of 1.569, equivalent to a 1.6% greater chance of 
a downgrade.   
 Table 5 shows the results of ordered logistic regressions that seek to explain the level of 
short- and long-term credit ratings.  The ordered logistic regressions are run with values of credit 
ratings in descending order.  Thus, the regressions model the odds of receiving a credit rating 
with a higher cardinal value (e.g., a short-term credit rating move from 3 to 4 or a long-term 
rating move from 6 to 7).  Ratings with higher cardinal values correspond to lower credit ratings. 
Table 5 shows that the variable of interest, SOX*EM, which reflects the difference in the 
SOX era in credit rating levels for firms that manage earnings more aggressively versus those that 
do not, explains both short- and long-term rating levels.  Models (1) and (4) show that, in the 
SOX era, firms that manage earnings more aggressively than the median have higher odds of 
short- and long-term ratings in a lower category (i.e., rating downgrades) by a factor of 1.440 and 
1.321, respectively.  Those respective increases in odds equal increases in the probability of lower 
ratings of 1.4% and 1.3%.   
 In Table 5, Models (1) through (3) show that the dummy variable SOX, which captures 
changes surrounding SOX that affect all firms in the sample, does not affect the level of short-
term credit ratings.  However, Models (4) through (6) show that SOX is associated with lower 
long-term credit ratings.  These results make sense because companies were allowed to 
implement some provisions of SOX well after July 30, 2002, the date of enactment.  Since those 
provisions would clearly take effect in the future, it makes sense that SOX, which captures 
changes related to SOX over time for all firms, does not affect short-term credit rating levels but 
does explain long-term rating levels.   
Table 5 shows that INTCOV is associated with lower cardinal values mapped to long-
term ratings, corresponding to higher actual ratings.  This result makes sense because, as a firm’s 
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interest coverage ratio increases, its ability to meet its interest obligations increases, making that 
firm a more creditworthy borrower.  Table 5 also shows that IGRADE is associated with a lower 
cardinal value (i.e., higher credit rating) for long-term credit ratings.  This result suggests that, as 
expected, an investment-grade credit rating is less likely to be downgraded.  EM, which captures 
differences in the short- and long-term rating levels of high- and low-earnings-management firms 
across the sample period, is associated with higher short- and long-term rating levels. 
For short-term rating levels, D/A is negative, suggesting that a higher debt ratio is 
associated with a lower cardinal value (higher credit rating).  This result is consistent with Ross 
(1977), as taking more debt in the short-term may signal high firm value to rating agencies.  On 
the other hand, a higher debt ratio is associated with lower long-term credit ratings.  This result is 
consistent with Myers (1977), as rating agencies may believe that higher leverage may reduce 
firm value in the long run due to debt overhang. 
Table 6 shows the results of ordinal logistic regressions where the sample is broken out 
by high or low earnings management.  A firm is said to have high (low) earnings management if 
the absolute value of its earnings management exceeds the median absolute level for all firms.  
The main result is that SOX is associated with higher cardinal values (lower credit ratings).  SOX 
is associated with lower short-term credit rating levels, regardless of the degree of earnings 
management.  For example, the first two models show that low-earnings-management firms have 
higher odds of a short- (long-) term rating downgrade by factors of 1.313 (1.242), respectively.  
These increases in odds correspond to 1.3% and 1.2% increases, respectively, in the probability of 
a short- or long-term rating downgrade.  The third model shows that high-earnings-management 
firms have higher odds of a short-term rating decrease by a factor of 1.399.  This result equates to 
a 1.4% higher probability of a downgrade.  These results are consistent with the idea that SOX 
requires managers to reveal bad news, which they would prefer to conceal (Akhigbe, Martin, and 
Newman, 2008).  These results are also consistent with the intent of SOX, which was to spur 
managers to take steps to report financial results accurately. 
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However, the fourth model in Table 6 shows that SOX does not affect the level of long-
term credit ratings for high-earnings-management firms.  An explanation for this result is that 
investors could expect managers to conservatively report earnings in the long run, over which 
time investors will know more about the true value of firms.  This explanation is consistent with 
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) and Chang, Fernando, and Liao (2009).  Table 6 also shows that 
investment-grade status (IGRADE) is associated with lower cardinal rating values (higher credit 
ratings).  Also, the existence of a firm’s credit rating on the upper (lower) border of a rating range 
is associated with higher (lower) credit ratings.  In addition, higher leverage is associated with 
lower credit ratings, consistent with Myers (1977). 
Table 7 contains ordered logistic regression results based on whether a firm is listed in 
the U.S. or Canada.  Listing location may impact the results of this study because SOX applies 
only to firms listed in the U.S.  Thus, the negative news about firms associated with SOX 
(Akhigbe, Martin, and Newman, 2008) may apply to only U.S.-listed firms, regardless of where 
they are headquartered.   
To test the effect of listing on credit rating changes, I introduce the variables U.S.-
LISTED, U.S.-IN-U.S., and X-LISTED to the models discussed above.  U.S.-LISTED equals one 
for U.S.-listed firms, regardless of whether those firms are based in the U.S or Canada, and zero 
otherwise.  U.S.-IN-U.S. equals one if a firm is based in the U.S. and listed on a U.S. exchange 
and zero otherwise.  X-LISTED equals one if a firm is headquartered in Canada and cross-listed 
in the U.S. and zero otherwise.   
Consistent with earlier tables, Table 7 shows that high earnings management in the SOX 
era explains lower credit rating levels (i.e., that the interaction term, SOX*EM, explains lower 
short- and long-term credit rating levels).  For example, U.S.-based and -listed firms that 
aggressively manage earnings in the SOX era have higher odds of a rating downgrade by a factor 
of 1.393, translating to a higher probability of downgrade of 1.4%.  Also, across the sample 
period, EM explains lower credit ratings.  As in prior tables, high earnings management is 
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associated with lower credit rating levels.  In addition, the variable SOX, which captures the 
effect of environmental changes specifically related to SOX on firms in the sample, generally 
explains lower credit ratings.  This result is also consistent with prior findings. 
Table 8 contains robustness tests that show the results of ordered logistic regressions that 
explain credit rating levels for all quarters from 2000 to 2004 by firm size, defined as the market 
value of assets.  The book value of debt is used as the market value of debt.  The market value of 
equity is the product of the number of outstanding shares and the closing stock price, both as of 
the end of each quarter.  Sorting by size is relevant because large firms typically have greater 
analyst coverage compared to small firms.  Greater analyst coverage means that investors are 
exposed to less information asymmetry from large firms relative to small firms.  As a result, large 
firms might be less likely to experience a credit rating downgrade even in the SOX era.  Two 
market-value ranges are considered in Table 7:  (1) small firms, defined as those with a market 
value of assets of less than $10 billion and (2) large firms, with market value of assets of at least 
$10 billion.   
The main result of Table 8 is that the previous finding that, in the SOX era, high earnings 
management is associated with lower credit rating levels is generally robust to size.  The second 
leftmost model, with a coefficient of 0.436 on SOX*EM, indicates that relatively large firms that 
aggressively manage earnings after SOX have higher odds of a short-term credit rating 
downgrade by a factor of 1.546.  This result corresponds to a higher probability of a downgrade 
of 1.5%.  This finding is also consistent with Table 5, which shows that, in the SOX era, high 
earnings management is associated with lower credit rating levels for firms in general.  For long-
term ratings, the coefficient of 0.444 for relatively small firms implies higher odds (probability) 
of a rating downgrade of 1.559 (1.6%) after SOX.  In addition, Table 7 shows that EM is robust 
to size.  All models show that, as earnings management increases, both short- and long-term 
credit rating levels decrease.  The variable SOX is generally robust to size, as it explains lower 
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credit rating levels for relatively large firms.  The results of the remaining explanatory variables 
are also consistent with prior results. 
 Table 9 contains robustness tests that include ordered logistic regression results based on 
changes in suppliers’ expectations about the economy.  Controlling for economic expectations 
constitutes a relevant robustness test because lower credit ratings could be due to unfavorable 
prospects for the economy, irrespective of SOX.  To proxy for suppliers’ expectations, I include 
in regression models the values of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) Index, which used 
to be known as the National Association of Purchasing Managers’ (NAPM) Index.  An Index 
value greater than 50 implies that suppliers have a positive outlook about the economy.   
The ISM index is used to explain the inventories of U.S. firms (Chen, Frank, and Wu, 
2005) and to serve as an economy-wide measure of U.S. national economic activity (Evans, Liu, 
and Pham-Kanter, 2002).  If credit rating agencies believe that those firms’ values will 
increase in either the short or long run by undertaking investment, which will enhance 
those firms’ ability to repay their debts by generating positive profit and cash flow, rating 
agencies will increase credit ratings.  The variable NAPMISM contains data on suppliers’ 
economic expectations, reflecting their outlook on the economy.  
The main result of Table 9 is that, consistent with earlier results, lower credit 
rating levels in the SOX era are generally robust to economic expectations (i.e., that 
SOX*EM is robust to NAPMISM).  Also, consistent with prior tables, SOX and EM 
individually explain lower credit rating levels. 
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Chapter Ten:  Conclusion 
Previous research argues that SOX requires managers to reveal bad news about their 
firms.  Bad news may cause market participants – including credit rating agencies – to update 
their beliefs about those firms and conclude that their outlook is not as profitable as initially 
thought.  In this paper, I examine short- and long-term credit ratings after SOX.  The main finding 
is that, using ordinal logistic regression, aggressive earnings management is associated with lower 
credit rating levels in the SOX era.  This result is robust to size and suppliers’ expectations of the 
economy. 
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Table 1 – Short- and Long-Term Credit Ratings 
Panel A – Short-Term Credit Ratings 
 
Credit   
Rating  #  Pre-SOX  Post-SOX Total 
 
A-1+  1  214   123  337 
 
A-1  2  413   276  689 
 
A-2  3  526   292  818 
 
A-3  4  94   65  159 
 
B  5  7   6  13 
 
B-1  6  0   0  0 
 
B-2  7  0   0  0 
 
B-3  8  0   0  0 
 
C  9  0   0  0 
 
D           10  0   0  0 
All    1254   762  2016 
 
Panel B – Long-Term Credit Ratings 
 
Credit   
Rating  #  Pre-SOX  Post-SOX Total 
 
AAA  1  57   32  89 
 
AA+  2  9   6  15 
 
AA  3  68   46  114 
 
AA-  4  84   37  121 
 
A+  5  152   86  238 
 
A  6  313   216  529 
 
A-  7  226   183  409 
 
BBB+  8  417   217  634 
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BBB  9  497   366  863 
  
BBB-  10  447   255  702 
 
BB+  11  335   220  555 
 
BB  12  409   286  695 
 
BB-  13  456   352  808 
 
B+  14  404   246  650 
 
B  15  147   143  290 
 
B-  16  48   57  105 
 
CCC+  17  30   12  42 
 
CCC  18  1   3  4 
 
CCC-  19  0   1  1 
 
CC  20  1   1  2 
 
D  21  16   3  19 
 
SD  22  4   1  5 
 
All    4121   2769  6890 
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
Panel A – Pre-SOX 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  
INTCOV  8.63  7.29  45.91  
 
D/A   0.38  0.38  0.16 
 
EM   0.002  -0.011  0.25 
 
MKTRET  -0.001  0.002  0.0004  
 
Panel B – Post-SOX 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  
INTCOV  8.50  8.47  33.91   
 
D/A   0.37  0.38  0.16 
 
EM   -0.183*** -0.196*** 0.46*** 
 
MKTRET  0.006  0.016  0.0005  
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Table 3 – Rating Changes 
 
Panel A – Short-Term Credit Rating Changes 
 
          Rating Change 
Year   Downgrades  None  Upgrades  Total 
2000   1017   148  22   1187 
 
2001   944   349  18   1311 
 
2002   1045   381  15   1441 
 
2003   1074   362  16   1452 
 
2004   1111   381  7   1499 
 
All              5191               1621  78               6890 
 
Panel B – Long-Term Credit Rating Changes 
 
          Rating Change 
Year   Downgrades  None  Upgrades  Total 
2000   604   389  194   1187 
 
2001   170   1031  110   1311 
 
2002   115   1205  121   1441 
 
2003     95   1263    94   1452 
 
2004     99   1330    70   1499 
 
All             1083               5218  589               6890 
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Table 4 – Odds of Credit Rating Downgrade 
 
 
        Short-Term Downgrades                      Long-Term Downgrades        
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Intercept  1.088*** 1.061*** 1.135*** -1.256*** -1.026*** -1.241*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
    
SOX   0.132*  0.135*  0.134*  -1.819*** -1.829** -1.847*** 
   .0941  .0885  .0972  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   1.141  1.145  1.144  0.162  0.161  0.158   
 
INTCOV    -0.007*** -0.008***      
     <.0001  <.0001       
     0.993  0.992       
 
UPPERBORDER   -1.822***        
     .0040         
     0.162         
 
LOWERBORDER -2.245***   -2.331***      
   <.0001    <.0001       
   0.106    0.097       
 
D/A           -0.626***  
           .0017   
           0.535   
 
EM   1.221*** 1.192*** 1.185*** 0.450** 0.448*** 0.448*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   3.392  3.294  3.272  1.569  1.565  1.565 
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MKTRET      0.578  -3.368  -3.380***  
       .4975  .0005  .0005   
       1.783  0.034  0.034    
 
SOX*EM  0.245** 0.303*** 0.278*** 0.581*** 0.593*** 0.570*** 
   .0190  .0043  .0100  .0009  .0007  .0011 
   1.278  1.354  1.320  1.788  1.809  1.768 
 
Wald Tests: 
SOX + SOX*EM = 0 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001     
EM + SOX*EM = 0 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001     
 
N   6257  5962  5962  6873  6873  6257 
-2LogL   6986.632 6772.883 6614.925 5527.843 5517.977 3193.487 
Wald   280.859 207.563 325.502 327.646 335.848 86.064 
Wald Test Pr > χ2 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
 
82 
 
Table 5 –Credit Rating Levels 
 
 
           Short-Term Ratings                          Long-Term Ratings        
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
SOX   0.146  0.179  0.085  0.169*** 0.176*** 0.144** 
   .2339  .1359  .5009  .0040  .0031  .0163 
   1.157  1.196  1.088  1.184  1.193  1.155   
 
INTCOV          -0.011*** -0.006*** 
           <.0001  <.0001  
           0.989  0.994 
 
IGRADE  -0.144      -5.473***   -5.631***  
   .4078      <.0001    <.0001 
   0.866      0.004    0.004 
 
UPPERBORDER       -0.430***   -0.450*** 
         <.0001    <.0001 
         0.650    0.638 
 
LOWERBORDER     5.254***   0.348***   
       <.0001    <.0001   
       191.392   1.417   
 
D/A   -1.121*** -1.143***   3.161***     
   .0055  .0027    <.0001     
   0.326  0.319    23.585     
 
EM   1.387*** 1.315*** 1.356*** 1.069*** 1.311*** 0.852*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   4.003  3.723  3.879  2.913  3.710  2.344 
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MKTRET  -1.013  -0.751  -1.165       
   .4051  .5294  .3497       
   0.363  0.472  0.312        
 
SOX*EM  0.364** 0.303*  0.427** 0.278*** 0.364*** 0.290*** 
   .0304  .0670  .0146  .0001  <.0001  .0001 
   1.440  1.354  1.533  1.321  1.439  1.336 
 
Wald Tests: 
SOX + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.0002 p=0.0002 p=0.0003 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001     
EM + SOX*EM = 0 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001     
 
N   1849  2016  1849  6257  5962  5962 
-2LogL   4583.651 5004.744 4049.069 26765.774 29975.079 25859.590 
Wald   93.310  92.524  409.982 3171.984 679.130 2661.341 
Wald Test Pr > χ2 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
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Table 6 – Regressions of High- versus Low-Earnings-Management Firms 
 
          Low    High 
    Earnings   Earnings 
    Management      Management 
   Short-Term Long-Term Short-Term Long-Term  
   Ratings  Ratings  Ratings  Ratings  
 
SOX   0.272** 0.217*** 0.335*** -0.003 
   .0465  .0007  <.0001  .9673 
   1.313  1.242  1.399  0.997 
 
IGRADE  -0.412*  -5.148***   -6.136***   
   .0758  <.0001    <.0001 
   0.662  0.618    0.002 
 
UPPERBORDER   -0.564***   -0.259*** 
     <.0001    .0003 
     0.569    0.772 
 
LOWERBORDER 5.231***   0.471*** 
   <.0001    <.0001 
   187.013   1.601 
 
D/A   5.023*** 2.967*** 4.379*** 3.081*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   151.931 19.430  79.735  21.773 
 
N   974  3332  3332  2938   
-2LogL   2027.582 14391.785 16471.109 12550.082  
Wald   271.928 1648.746 544.034 1323.428  
Wald Test Pr > χ2 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
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Table 7 – Listing Location 
 
 
Short-Term Credit Ratings   Long-Term Credit Ratings 
        All U.S.- U.S.-Based, Cross-  All U.S.- U.S.-Based, Cross-  
Listed Firms -Listed Firms Listed Firms    Listed Firms -Listed Firms Listed Firms 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
SOX   -0.670  1.210** 0.184  0.280  0.279*  0.192*** 
   .6043  .0209  .1246  .1934  .0828  .0015 
   0.512  3.354  1.202  1.324  1.322  1.212  
 
INTCOV  -0.039***     -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
   <.0001      <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
   0.961      0.989  0.989  0.989  
 
LOWERBORDER 4.853***     0.348*** 0.349*** -0.241 
   <.0001      <.0001  <.0001  .1016 
   128.142     1.417  1.417  0.786 
 
EM   0.987*** 1.337*** 1.297*** 1.314*** 1.299*** 1.293*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  
   2.684  3.808  3.657  3.720  3.664  3.642 
 
MKTRET        0.506  0.543   
         .4294  .3965   
         1.659  1.721 
 
SOX*EM  0.277  0.332** 0.290*  0.364*** 0.357*** 0.326*** 
   .1376  .0461  .0806  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   1.319  1.393  1.336  1.439  1.430  1.385  
 
U.S.-LISTED  -1.240      -0.018   
   .1456      .9128    
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   0.289      0.983    
 
 
U.S.-IN-U.S.    -0.240      0.234** 
     .4703      .0444 
     0.787      1.264 
 
CROSS-LISTED     -0.858**     -0.494*** 
       .0236      .0024 
       0.424      0.610 
 
SOX*U.S.-LISTED 0.850      -0.116   
   .5134      .5928   
   2.339      0.891   
 
SOX*U.S.-IN-U.S.   -1.043**     -0.113 
     .0479      .4874 
     0.353      0.893 
 
SOX*CROSS-LISTED     1.025*      0.032 
       .0916      .8918 
       2.786      1.033 
 
Wald Tests: 
SOX + SOX*EM + p=0.0023     p<0.0001 
 SOX*USLISTED = 0 
SOX + SOX*EM + 
 SOX*USINUS = 0   p=0.0001     p<0.0001 
SOX + SOX*EM + 
 SOX*CROSS_LISTED = 0    p=0.0150     p=0.0203 
EM + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 
 
N   1787  2016  2016  5962  5962  5962 
-2LogL   3598.493 5006.247 5009.478 29973.573 29968.842 30006.555 
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Wald   571.821 92.550  89.390  680.154 684.0100 643.723 
Wald Test Pr > χ2 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
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Table 8 – Size Regressions 
 
 
            Short-Term Ratings             Long-Term Ratings        
[0, 10)  > 10  [0, 10)  > 10 
 
SOX   0.170  0.350** 0.063  0.319***  
   0.385  0.025  0.350  0.008   
   1.186  1.419  1.065  1.376   
  
INTCOV           
             
            
IGRADE      -5.324*** -5.256***  
       <.0001  <.0001   
       0.005  0.005   
  
UPPERBORDER     -0.194*** -0.982***  
       0.0004  <.0001   
       0.823  0.374    
 
LOWERBORDER        
          
          
 
D/A   0.154  -1.381***      
   0.801  0.006       
   1.166  0.251 
            
EM   0.682** 1.561*** 1.038*** 0.602***   
   0.015  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001   
   1.977  4.762  2.823  1.826   
  
MKTRET  -0.072  0.130   
   0.970  0.935   
   0.930  1.139   
 
SOX*EM  -0.124  0.436** 0.444*** -0.004    
   0.664  0.035  <.0001  0..9768   
   0.884  1.546  1.559  0.996   
  
Wald Tests: 
SOX + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.8358 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p=0.0086   
EM + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.2656 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p=0.0090  
    
 
N   841  1175  4677  1580    
-2LogL   1808.133 2901.456 20363.760 5957.184   
Wald   11.682  85.431  1487.367 886.703  
Wald Test Pr > χ2 0.039  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
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Table 9 – Economic Expectations 
 
         
          Short-Term Ratings                         Long-Term Ratings        
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
SOX   0.261** 0.179  0.124  0.156** 0.114*  0.183*** 
   .0447  .1672  .3717  .0105  .0704  .0030 
   1.298  1.196  1.132  1.169  1.121  1.201 
 
INTCOV  -0.045***   -0.040*** -0.011*** -0.011***   
   <.0001    <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
   0.956    0.961  0.989  0.989 
 
IGRADE    -0.151 
     .3842 
     0.860 
 
UPPERBORDER           0.145*** 
             .0025 
             1.156 
              
LOWERBORDER     4.922***   0.349*** 
       <.0001    <.0001 
       137.323   1.418 
 
D/A     -1.130***       4.291*** 
     .0051        <.0001 
     0.323        73.038 
 
EM   0.897*** 1.384*** 0.986*** 1.107*** 1.310*** 1.550*** 
   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
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   2.452  3.990  2.680  3.025  3.707  4.710 
 
MKTRET    -1.118    0.770  0.717  0.543 
     .3614    .2219  .2656  .3873 
     0.327    2.159  2.049  1.721 
 
SOX*EM  0.175  0.361** 0.275  0.262*** 0.361*** 0.282*** 
   .3219  .0318  .1388  .0003  <.0001  .0001 
   1.191  1.435  1.317  1.299  1.434  1.326 
 
NAPMISM  0.012  -0.007  0.012  0.011** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
   .1745  .4397  .2234  .0142  .0044  .0052 
   1.012  0.993  1.012  1.011  1.013  1.012 
 
Wald Tests: 
SOX + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.0024 p=0.0001 p=0.0100 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 
EM + SOX*EM = 0 p=0.0004 p<0.0001 p=0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 
 
N   1948  1849  1787  6535  5962  6257 
-2LogL   4434.216 4583.056 3599.105 32937.172 29966.332 30846.681  
Wald   326.242 93.916  573.227 634.376 686.832 1319.327 
Wald Test Pr > χ2 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
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